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IN THE HEAT OF THE CHASE:
DETERMINING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
POLICE PURSUITS WHEN AN INNOCENT
BYSTANDER IS INJURED
The Due Process Clause, "like its forebear in the Magna Carta . . . was
'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government' .... ,1
I. INTRODUCTION
As sirens shriek and lights flash, the police chase the suspect's vehicle
through crowded and narrow city streets at an excessive rate of speed. During
the chase, the suspect miscalculates a turn in the road which ends the chase in
a ghastly and bloody crash, killing an innocent bystander. This catastrophic
scene not only occurs in movies and on television, but it also ensues on our
nation's streets and highways, resulting in hundreds of fatalities annually. 2
These accidents have led to an increase in litigation against police officers
and municipalities.3 Individuals harmed as a result of such police pursuits have
1. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)).
2. One study reports that 45 % of high speed pursuits end in property damage, 23 % cause
personal injury, and 34% result in an accident. See Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham,
Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521,
528 (1989). Additionally, it has been estimated that between 50,000 and 500,000 high speed
pursuits take place each year in the United States. See generally, E. FENNESSY, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF HOT PURSUIT BY THE POLICE (1970). See also Jones v.
Chieffo, 833 F. Supp. 498, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (providing evidence that in the City of
Philadelphia, 2.10 pursuits occur per day; 32% of pursuits result in some type of accident; 3% of
the accidents involve injuries to innocent persons; 1% involve death; and 21% of the accidents
involve the pursued automobile and an innocent bystander).
3. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994); Medina v. City and
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945
F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987); Nishiyama v. Dickson
County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir. 1986);
Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1985); Walton v. Salter, 547 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976);
Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F. Supp. 1184 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Frye v. Town of Akron,
759 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189 (E.D.
Ark. 1989). For a discussion of trends in lawsuits against police based upon portions of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police Survey, see W. Schmidt, Recent Developments in Police
Civil Liability, 4 J. PoLcE Sc. & ADMIN. 197 (1976).
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generally sought relief against police officers and municipalities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 19834 to enforce the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. The
objective of § 1983 is to provide a remedy for constitutional deprivations caused
by state actors or by operation of state law.5 As a result, § 1983 authorizes a
court to grant relief when an individual is deprived of federal statutory or
constitutional rights, including the rights6 of life, liberty,7 or property, in
4. Civil Rights Act of 1871, Ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988)) [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or § 1983]. Congress enacted this provision on
April 20, 1871, and entitled it as "An act to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." The statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id. Section 1983 addresses constitutional infringements by individuals acting under color of state
law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Although the statute does not apply to
unconstitutional acts under color of federal law, an aggrieved plaintiff may nonetheless institute a
cause of action against federal actors. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
5. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6. The scope and analysis of this note is limited to violations of substantive due process
preserved under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Due Process
Clause provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail in a case brought under § 1983
for violations of the Due Process Clause, the aggrieved plaintiff must show the following: (1) that
the defendant acted under color of state law, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-87 (1961); (2) that
a protected property interest or a liberty interest was at risk, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 570-78 (1972);.Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); (3) that the defendant had a duty of care
toward the plaintiff, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123-30 (1989), DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195-203 (1989); and (4) that the
deprivation occurred within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 329-33 (1986).
7. The concept of "liberty" acts as the primary limitation on the states with respect to individual
rights; however, it remains a rather arduous task to precisely define a "liberty" interest. See Rosalie
B. Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance
Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REv. 313, 315 (1991). The Supreme Court,
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), proposed this definition of "liberty":
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty.., guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the ordinary
pursuit of happiness ....
Id. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Of Libervy and Property, 62 CORNELLL. REV. 405 (1977).
Cf. Levinson, supra, at 315 (observing that, although the Court has "broadly defined the term
'liberty' to 'embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free
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violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, by a state or local official or other
person who acted under color of state law." Historically, the Substantive Due
Process Clause. has been used to challenge egregious deprivations of property
to use them in all lawful ways,' federal courts are rather reluctant to adhere to this expansive
interpretation.") (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)). See also JOHN E.
NOwAK Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 459 (3d ed. 1986) (noting that the specific definition of
"liberty" cannot be ascribed because it encompasses any form of freedom of action or choice which
is bestowed constitutional recognition by the Court).
8. A person acts "under color of state law" when exercising power "possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law." United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111
(1945). See, e.g., Rivera v. LaPorte, 896 F.2d 691, 696 (2d Cir. 1990); Lusby v. T.G. & Y.
Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985) (finding
that an off-duty policeman working as a private security guard acts "under color of state law" if he
identifies himself as a police officer, or if a statute requires officers to engage in law enforcement
activities 24 hours a day); Keller v. District of Columbia, 809 F. Supp. 432, 437 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(noting that the act of making an arrest, by means of a marked police uniform and badge and a
firearm issued by the state, is an act performed under color of state law regardless of whether the
state official had the actual jurisdiction to make the arrest); Reverie v. Charles County Comm'r, 882
F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989) (asserting that an off-duty officer who is compelled by law to be on
duty 24 hours a day acts "under color of state law" if the officer acts according to his established
authority).
But see Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that an
off-duty officer who shot his wife "in the ambit of [his] personal pursuits" rather than under his
actual duty did not act "under color of state law"); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1516
(7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the actions of police officers, executed while on duty and in uniform,
are not conducted "under color of state law" unless these actions are in some manner related to the
performance of official duties); Long v. Mercer County, 795 F. Supp. 873, 875-76 (C.D. Ill. 1992)
(holding that a government official charged with committing sexual abuse during the course of
performing his duties did not act under color of law, absent a showing that the abuse was in some
manner related to performance of defendant's duties); cf. Malone v. County of Suffolk, 968 F.2d
1480, 1483 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that by bringing a § 1983 action, plaintiff all but conceded to
the fact that the officer acted "under color of state law"). See aLso United States v. Tarpley, 945
F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 917 (1992) (holding that the "under color of
state law" inquiry does not turn on the duty status of officers or on whether they acted for personal
reasons; rather, the plaintiff's verdict was upheld where the officer identified himself as a policeman,
used a police weapon, invoked official authority, summoned another officer and used a squad car);
Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the county jailer's use of force
in the jail against a public official was under color of state law because the jailer had the authority
to carry a gun in the jail).
The Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement and § 1983's "under color of state law"
requirement have been thought, for all pragmatic purposes, to be the same. United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 152 (1978), the
Court implied that a § 1983 plaintiff must separately establish both state action and color of state
law. However, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982), the Court held that
when the challenged conduct constitutes state action, the conduct also constitutes color of state law.
Id.
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and liberty, whether executed by legislative or administrative enactments, or by
the misconduct of government officials.9
Additionally, it is significant to note that § 1983 provides a vehicle for
enforcing federal rights, but does not create any new substantive rights."0 As
a result, the Supreme Court has consistently held that a § 1983 claim requires
only a showing that an action taken "under color of state law" caused a
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity.1'
Thus, to prevail on a cause of action under § 1983, an aggrieved plaintiff must
show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting
under color of state law;2 and (2) that this conduct deprived the plaintiff of a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or the
laws of the United States.' 3 Although § 1983 itself does not impose any state
9. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (noting that the substantive aspect of the
Due Process Clause is used to "[pirevent governmental power from being 'used for purposes of
oppression'")(quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 277 (1856)). Essentially, substantive due process prevents the government from interfering
with an individual's liberty or property based on arbitrary or vindictive purposes. See, e.g., Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, (1992) (asserting that "the Due Process Clause . . . bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions").
10. Since § 1983 does not establish any substantive rights, a plaintiff need only prove all the
elements of the underlying constitutional right. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30
(1986). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (stating that the Court refused to
interpret a specific intent requirement into § 1983); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981)
-(noting that § 1983 has never been found by this Court to contain a state of mind requirement). In
fact, the Parrau Court quoted Justice Douglas' famous "background of tort liability" language and
determined that:
[Iln any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential
elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was
committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
Id. at 535. Thus, the Parran Court decisively determined that a prima facie case under § 1983
requires only that the conduct be committed under color of state law and that such conduct caused
a constitutional violation. But see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (holding that
negligent conduct cannot constitute a deprivation of due process).
11. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-
39 (1981); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
12. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). See also supra note 8 and accompanying
text for a discussion on the meaning of the term "under color of state law."
13. Parrau, 451 U.S. at 535; Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330. It is more accurate, however, to view
a § 1983 claim for relief as imposing four separate requirements: (1) a violation of a right protected
by the federal Constitution, (2) proximately caused (3) by the conduct of a person (4) who acted
under color of state law, statute, ordinance, or regulation. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E.
KIRKUN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 1.4 (2d ed. 1991).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 [1995], Art. 4
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of mind requirement, 4 the underlying constitutional right alleged may
encompass such a requirement. 5 One such area where the state of mind
inquiry becomes relevant is when the constitutional deprivation concerns
governmental misconduct implicating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 6 In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled that such a Fourteenth
Amendment deprivation must flow from conduct amounting to more than mere
negligence.' 7 However, the Supreme Court has specifically left open the
question of whether intentional conduct is necessary, or whether something less,
such as gross negligence" or recklessness, is sufficient to invoke the
14. On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that since § 1983 does not
contain a state of mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the
underlying constitutional right, the plaintiff need only prove a violation of the underlying
constitutional right. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). See also ROSALIE B.
LEVINSON & IVAN E. BODENSTEINER, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND LmGATION il-45 (1994)
(noting that since § 1983 does not establish any substantive protections, "plaintiffs must plead all
of the elements of the underlying constitutional or federal statutory right they seek to enforce");
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th
Cir. 1981) (declaring that "[s]ection 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the
Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.").
15. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In DanieLs, the Court noted that "in any
given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and
depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim." Id. at 330.
Additionally, the appropriate culpability level of a governmental official emerges from the Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is important to note that as an interpreter, the
Supreme Court undertakes a dual role. See Susanah M. Mead, Evolution of the 'Species of Tort
Liability' Created by 42 U.S. C. § 1983: Can Constitutional Tort be Saved From Extinction?, 55
FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1986). On one hand, as a statutory interpreter, the Court examines
and evaluates the variety of tort liability created by Congress in § 1983. Id. In this role, the Court
has never deviated from its position that § 1983 contains no independent state of mind requirement.
See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534
(1981); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). On the other hand, as constitutional
interpreter, the Court has the power to mold the future of constitutional torts by the development
of constitutional doctrine. Mead, supra, at 13-14. As a constitutional interpreter, the Court has
demonstrated that state of mind may play an integral part in the resolution of whether a constitutional
violation has occurred. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 329-32; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976).
16. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1986).
17. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3.
18. Prosser and Keeton have attempted to define the term "gross negligence." W. PAGE
KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31-32, at 169-85 (5th ed. 1984).
Although there appears to be no generally accepted meaning of what type of conduct constitutes
gross negligence, the authors suggest that when a court uses the term, it probably indicates "more
than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the
consequences." Id. at 212.
19. In defining recklessness, Prosser and Keeton stated that courts use willful and wanton as
synonyms for recklessness. Further, recklessness implies that "the actor has intentionally done an
act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to
make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which is usually accompanied by a conscious
indifference to the consequences." Id. at 213.
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protections of the Due Process Clause. 2
Consequently, although lower courts are aware of the notion that mere
negligence will not rise to the level of a due process violation,2 they have
struggled to determine precisely what level of culpability is necessary to trigger
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause when a deprivation
involves governmental misconduct.' In light of the Supreme Court's holding
that mere negligence is insufficient, most circuit courts have posited that an
official's reckless or deliberate indifference may give rise to a due process
claim.' However, a few circuit courts have held that gross negligence may
rise to the level of a substantive due process violation.'
20. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986). Today, this question remains
unanswered. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 198 n.10
(1989). But see Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) ("The harm... is the
same whether [the injury is inflicted] negligently, recklessly, or intentionally .... In each instance,
the prisoner is [being 'deprived' of) an aspect of liberty as the result, in part, of a form of state
action.").
In Daniels, the Court failed to enunciate a real reason for its conclusion that due process
requires more than simple negligence. Instead, the Court spoke of the abuses of power and
fundamental fairness, never explicitly demonstrating why negligence could not be an abuse, or why
it could not be unfair. Id. at 331-32. Furthermore, the Daniels Court concluded that:
Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to
measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such
conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would
trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.
Id.
21. SeeTemkinv. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716,719 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
that mere negligence is not sufficient to "make out a claim under section 1983 and the Due Process
Clause"); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 193 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (observing that
the negligence of state actors will not support a § 1983 cause of action); Nishiyama v. Dickson
County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1986) (same).
22. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 336 (noting that although most lower courts are in agreement
that assertions of gross negligence are insufficient to trigger a due process violation, there remains
some question as to whether reckless conduct can rise to the level of a due process violation).
23. See, e.g., Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that "some
reckless acts may constitute due process violations while others may not"); Harris v. Maynard, 843
F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988) (declaring that wanton or obdurate disregard or deliberate
indifference may give rise to a due process claim); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219
(7th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (noting that the fire department dispatcher's refusal to send a rescue squad
after two requests by telephone was not reckless in the constitutional sense to support a section 1983
action); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 11, 18 (lst Cir. 1989); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez
Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1990); Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1986);
White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979); Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214-
15 (9th Cir. 1988), modified on reh'g, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).
24. See, e.g., Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that
governmental conduct in pursuing Sherrill did not constitute "gross negligence" necessary to sustain
a § 1983 action); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987); Colburn
v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1988); Vinson v. Campbell County
Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th Cir. 1987); Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 n.l
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Particularly, the lower federal courts are split regarding the appropriate
standard to apply in police pursuit cases where an innocent bystander is injured
by police officers.' While some lower federal courts have applied a "shocks
the conscience" standard, delineated by the Supreme Court in Rochin v.
California,2 to determine whether police conduct is actionable under
substantive due process, other courts have employed a recklessness or gross
negligence standard.' Today, there is much confusion in the lower federal
courts regarding the application of substantive due process principles in police
pursuit cases. As a result of this confusion, as well as with the dramatic
increase of § 1983 litigation, the issue of what culpability level is necessary
to cause a deprivation of an interest protected by the Substantive Due Process
Clause is ripe for debate.
(3d Cir. 1988). C. Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating
that in police pursuit cases gross negligence is insufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional
deprivation); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986); Archie v. City of Racine, 847
F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988) (asserting that reckless conduct "is a proxy for intent; 'gross
negligence' is not"); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1468 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828
(1987).
25. Numerous federal circuit courts have applied the "shocks the conscience" standard when
confronted with substantive due process challenges involving affirmative governmental conduct such
as police pursuit situations. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (3d Cir.
1994); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991); Newell v.
Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 127 (1993); Feliciano v. City
of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 657 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 114 S. Ct. 90 (1993); Salas v. Carpenter,
980 F.2d 299, 302-03, 309 (5th Cir. 1992); Reese v. Kennedy, 865 F.2d 186, 187-88 (8th Cir.
1989).
However, in cases involving police pursuits, other federal circuits and lower courts have
applied "recklessness" as the standard to determine whether a constitutional deprivation occurred.
See, e.g., Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying
the recklessness standard to police pursuits); Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277,
282 (6th Cir. 1987); Medeiros v. Town of South Kingstown, 821 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D.R.I. 1993)
(holding that to succeed on a substantive due process claim, the plaintiff must prove that the police
officer acted with "reckless or callous indifference" to the plaintiff's constitutional rights).
26. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the Court held that the Due Process Clause excluded the
admission of evidence at a criminal trial that had been obtained by forcibly pumping the defendant's
stomach. Id. at 172-73. The Court concluded that this police conduct was so egregious as to
"shockfl the conscience, [and] offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions
of justice of English-speaking persons even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses."
Id. at 169, 172 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)).
27. See infra notes 197-211 and accompanying text.
28. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1986). In his dissent in Patsy, Justice
Powell stated:
There has been a year-by-year increase in [§ 1983] suits since the mid-1960's. The
increase in fiscal 1981 over fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639
such suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 total constituted
over 8.6% of the total federal district court civil docket.
Id. at 534 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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This Note will examine the issue of what level of culpability is necessary
to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause in police pursuit cases., 9
Because most claims by aggrieved plaintiffs in pursuit cases are brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a brief history of § 1983 is provided in Section II of this
Note.' Additionally, since many aggrieved plaintiffs not only bring a cause
of action against the individual officer, but also against the municipality, this
Section addresses municipal liability under § 1983 for failure to train officers,"
as well as the qualified immunity defense used by police officers.32 Section III
discusses the origins of substantive due process and its application to
governmental misconduct.33 Section IV surveys several lower federal court
decisions that have resulted in confusion due to the different levels of culpability
these courts utilize to state a cause of action under the substantive component of
the Due Process Clause.' Finally, Section V of this Note proposes an analysis
to assist courts in determining the appropriate standard to apply in police pursuit
cases when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action alleging a substantive due process
violation.3" This Note proposes the standard of "deliberate indifference" as the
culpability level necessary to constitute a violation of substantive due process
within the framework of police pursuits.'
II. HISTORY AND EMERGENCE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND ITS
APPLICATION TO MUNICIPAL LiLmLrrY
A. Legislative History
In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
29. The author recognizes that a § 1983 cause of action requires a showing that an action taken
under color of state law has resulted in a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. However,
the scope of this note is limited to the issue of what level of culpability is needed to show a
deprivation of the underlying constitutional or federal right. Whereas some authors believe that this
state-of-mind issue should be analyzed under § 1983, the author of this note advocates the
proposition that the actionability of a police officer's conduct must be determined pursuant to
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, not § 1983. The rationale is that the Supreme Court, through
its interpretation of the legislative history of § 1983, has held that § 1983 does not have a state of
mind requirement independent of the culpability level necessary to state a violation of the underlying
constitutional right. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). Thus, the
determination of whether governmental conduct is actionable emerges through the courts'
interpretation of the Substantive Due Process Clause, not through the interpretation of § 1983.
30. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 90-151 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 167-211 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 219-307 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 257-307 and accompanying text.
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adopted by Congress. 3 Pursuant to its newly acquired powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress enacted section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, which is now § 1983.' It is abundantly clear that § 1983 was adopted
to address the failure of certain states to enforce their laws with an even
hand.39 Indeed, Congress adopted § 1983 "because, by reason of prejudice,
passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and
the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state
agencies."' ° Thus, § 1983 was enacted to establish a federal remedy that
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988)), had plentiful debate on both ends of the continuum. Representative Samuel Shellaburger,
who chaired a select committee, stated that there could be no doubt of the right of Congress to enact
the proposed legislation:
And how can there be a doubt about a question like that? To say in our Constitution
that all our people in the States shall be United States citizens, and also citizens of the
States; to add this as a curative, new and additional part of the instrument, and in it to
say that State laws shall not be made or enforced to abridge the rights of United States
citizens nor the States deny protection of these rights under law, and that Congress may
enforce these provisions securing these rights, and then to say that Congress can do no
such thing as make any law so enforcing these rights, nor open the United States courts
to enforce any such laws, but must leave all the protection and law-making to the very
States which are denying the protection, is plainly and grossly absurd.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at 68 (1871) [hereinafter GLOBE]. Furthermore, as with most
significant pieces of legislation, there was clamorous opposition to the bill. Opposition responses
ranged from cries of partisan politics, and an attempt to destroy the Democratic party in the South,
to denials that Klan violence still existed or was beyond the control of the states. See, e.g., GLOBE,
supra at 74-77. One of the most vocal opponents was Representative Michael Kerr of Indiana. Rep.
Kerr stated:
This section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights,
privileges, or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages against the
wrongdoer in the Federal courts. The offense committed against him may be the
common violations of the municipal law of his State. It may give rise to numerous
vexatious and outrageous prosecutions, inspired by mere mercenary considerations,
prosecuted in a spirit of plunder, aided by the crimes of perjury and subordination of
perjury, more reckless and dangerous to society than the alleged offenses out of which
the cause of action may have arisen. It is a covert attempt to transfer another large
portion of jurisdiction from the State tribunals, to which it of right belongs, to those of
the United States. It is neither authorized nor expedient, and it is not calculated to bring
peace, order, or domestic content or prosperity to the disturbed society of the South.
The contrary will certainly be its effect.
GLOBE, supra, at 50.
39. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418,426 (1973). See also Comment, Acdonability of Negligence Under Section 1.983 and the Eighth
Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 533, 549 (1978).
40. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180. In the legislative history of § 1983, Representative Lowe stated
that "local administrations have been found inadequate and unwilling to apply the proper corrective
[and] [c]ombinations. . . ." Id.
Undoubtedly, the 1871 Congress distrusted the fact-finding abilities of the state courts. See
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protects people from unconstitutional acts that occur under color of law,
regardless of whether the acts are legislative, judicial, or executive.4'
However, Congress did not set forth the specific level of culpability required to
state a claim under § 1983.42
Facing Congressional silence on this particular issue, the Supreme Court,
in interpreting § 1983, stated that it should be read against the background of
tort liability.43 Yet, because § 1983 is not explicit in its provisions, it has been
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980) (noting that "the debates [regarding the Civil Rights
Act of 1871] show that one strong motive behind [the Act's] enactment was grave congressional
concern that the state courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights"). Because the 1871
Congress distrusted state enforcement authorities, the Supreme Court has frequently relied on these
factors to interpret § 1983 in a manner that accentuates the independent and uniquely federal nature
of the § 1983 remedy. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (asserting that the state-of-
notice claim rules do not apply to § 1983 claims); Monroev. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (espousing
the view that the federal § 1983 remedy is independent of state judicial remedies).
41. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985); Mitehum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39,
242 (1972); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 1.03 (2d ed.
1986). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961). In Monroe, the Court expressed
three purposes of the Ku Klux Klan Act: (1) to "override certain kinds of state laws;" (2) to afford
a remedy where there was an inadequate state law; (3) to establish a federal remedy where the state
remedy, although adequate in theory, was not available in practice. Id. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text (discussing what constitutes "under color of state law").
42. Although Representative Shellaburger, the sponsor of the original bill, did not mention any
state of mind requirement for § 1, the concern about liability without fault was at least suggested by
two opponents of the bill in the House. See Mead, supra note 15, at 17 n.87.
Representative Whitthorne of Tennessee forewarned what he considered the dangers of this
section to a state employee who acts without fault:
It will be noted that by the first section suits may be instituted without regard to amount
or character of claim by any person within the limits of the United States who conceives
that he has been deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured him by the
Constitution of the United States, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State. That is to say, that if a police officer of the city of
Richmond or New York should find a drunken negro or white man upon the streets with
a loaded pistol flourishing it, .. . and by virtue of any ordinance, law, or usage, either
of city or State, he takes it away, the officer may be sued, because the right to bear
arms is secured by the Constitution, and such suit brought in distant and expensive
tribunals.
GLOBE, supra note 38, at 337.
Regardless of these concerns that state officials could be held liable for any act under color
of state law which violated a constitutional right, the House and Senate passed § 1 without including
a state of mind requirement.
43. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986). Unquestionably, the state of mind inquiry emerges from the underlying constitutional right
that is being alleged. Thus, in any § 1983 action, a "plaintiff must still prove a violation of the
underlying constitutional right ... ." Id. at 330.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 [1995], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss1/4
1995] IN THE HEAT OF THE CHASE 171
subject to an abundance of conflicting judicial interpretations and debate."
Additionally, as a result of the Supreme Court's restricted interpretations,'
only a paltry amount of cases were brought under § 1983 in the first five
decades following its enactment.' The statute lay dormant for the ninety years
following its promulgation until 1961 when the Court, in Monroe v. Pape,47
first recognized the broad reach of § 1983's protection.s
44. See SCHWARTZ & KIRKIN, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that the "Court's broad
interpretations of Section 1983 have generated considerable controversy"). For example, Justice
Powell stated in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), that § 1983
"already has burst its historical bounds." Id. Another court asserted that § 1983 represents an
"example of the sort of corruption to which the statute is now subject . . ., [and] mock[s] the
purposes for which this critical piece of legislation was intended." Kostiuk v. Town of Riverhead,
570 F. Supp. 603, 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Moreover, because of § 1983's ambiguous provisions, the Court has interpreted § 1983 to
incorporate such issues as municipal liability, see Monell v. Department of Social Serv', 436 U.S.
658 (1978), punitive damages, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), absolute immunity, see
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), and qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982).
45. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also NAHMOD, supra note 41, at § 2.02.
The reasons for the dormancy of § 1983 for 90 years can be attributed to the narrow application of
state action doctrine, the restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and
immunities clause, and the Court's unwillingness to thoroughly incorporate the provisions within the
Bill of Rights. Id.
46. See Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133, 1161 n.139 (1977) (noting that only 21 cases were brought under § 1983 between 1871 and
1920). Furthermore, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege and Immunities Clause to include only those rights
analogous to the existence of national government, thereby eliminating most civil rights from its
purview. Id. at 78-80.
47. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
48. In Monroe, the plaintiffs sought damages under § 1983 alleging Fourteenth Amendment
violations, and under a respondeat superior theory against the city of Chicago. Id. at 168-70. The
officers allegedly entered the plaintiff's home without warning and forced the occupants to stand
naked while the entire home was ransacked. Id. at 169. The plaintiff was then arrested, but later
released without being charged. Id. In Monroe, the Court increased the scope of § 1983 litigation
regarding the actions of government officials, but also briefly flirted with the concept of municipal
liability. Id at 190-91. Additionally, the Monroe Court stated that the plaintiff need not first exhaust
state judicial remedies before proceeding in a federal forum with a § 1983 claim. Id. at 183.
Furthermore, the Court held that the intent of Congress in 1871 was to establish a cause of
action for persons deprived of their constitutional rights by a government official's abuse of power.
Id. at 172. After examining the Act's legislative history, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
stated that one reason for the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a remedy in federal court to
ensure that the enjoyment of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment was not denied by
the prejudice, passion, and neglect of state law. Id. at 180. The Court further established that the
federal remedy provided by § 1983 "is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183. Moreover, the Court
stated that § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability.' Id. at 187.
Unfortunately, Justice Douglas failed to explain how this "background of tort liability" should be
used in § 1983 litigation.
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A civil rights action for a police officer's misconduct during a pursuit may
be brought against the police officer in both the officer's official and individual
capacity, or against the municipality itself.49 However, since most police
officers do not have the financial capacity to satisfy a sizeable judgment, a
damage action solely against the officer in his individual capacity may be
fruitless, unless the municipality indemnifies the officer.' Consequently, a
judgment that is enforceable directly against the municipality is more likely to
be satisfied."'
B. Evolution of § 1983 and Municipal Liability Based on Inadequate Training,
Supervision, or Discipline
Overturning its previous decision in Monroe, the Supreme Court, in Monell
v. Department of Social Services," held that municipalities are "persons" under
§ 1983 and, therefore, are accountable under the Act.3 Monell, however,
qualified municipal liability by cautioning that such liability should only attach
49. See e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Fagan
v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994); Medina v. City and Cty. of Denver, 960 F.2d
1493 (10th Cir. 1992).
50. See NAHMOD supra note 41, at 57 (discussing the types of fees and damages that may be
awarded against individual and governmental defendants).
51. It should be noted that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal damage suits against a
state. However, this amendment is not applicable to municipalities and, therefore, is not a bar
against them. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (holding that a
state is not a "person" as the term is used in § 1983); CONST. amend. XI. See also Monell v. New
York City Dep't. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (determining that a municipality
can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional
violation); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (holding that municipal liability
under § 1983 may be based upon a municipal entity's deliberately indifferent training policies which
were the direct cause of the violation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights).
52. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, certain female employees of the New York Department
of Social Services contested an institutional policy that required all pregnant employees to take
unpaid maternity leave before it was medically necessary. Id. at 660-61. The Court in Monell
engrossed itself in an in-depth analysis of the legislative history of § 1983 to determine why the
decision in Monroe was misplaced. The concern of the Monroe Court was that municipalities might
be required to create police forces or pay immeasurable damages. MoneUl, 436 U.S. at 673.
However, the Court did not contemplate that such a rejection meant that Congress repudiated the
concept of municipal liability, only that members of Congress envisioned liability for the acts of
municipalities as opposed to the acts of their private citizens. Id. at 665-67. See generally George
D. Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism:
A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The Official
Policy Cases, 27 B.C. L. RLy. 883 (1986).
53. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. MoneU! partially overruled Monroe v. Pape, 336 U.. 167
(1961), which had held that municipalities were not persons subject to suit under § 1983.
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where a municipal "policy or custom"' somehow "causes"" the violation of
the plaintiff's federally protected rights.' In fact, the Court limited municipal
liability by holding that liability does not attach to a municipality "solely because
it employs a tortfeasor." 57 Thus, the Court rejected the proposition that a
municipality could be held liable under § 1983 pursuant to a theory of
respondeat superior. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to
delineate the precise scope of municipal liability, 9 notwithstanding the fact that
after Monell, the Court was presented with the opportunity.'
54. Although the term "policy" has no exact definition, its existence is vital to the issue of
municipal liability. See Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 249, 253-54 (noting that the term policy is
merely a legal conclusion regarding those activities of municipal actors that should be vicariously
ascribed to the municipality for purposes of § 1983).
55. Additionally, "cause" was never specifically defined by the Court in Monel. See Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). See generally, Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal
Liability and Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625 (1989).
56. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The Court also stated
that it "attempted only to sketch so much of the Section 1983 cause of action against a local
government as is apparent from the history of the 1871 Act and ... prior cases." Id. at 695.
57. Id. at 691.
58. Id. The Court concluded that a municipality can only be "held liable [where] action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id. Additionally,
the Court noted that a municipality may be liable in certain circumstances for a "governmental
'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official
decision making channels." Id. at 690-91 (relying on Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970)).
In essence, what the Supreme Court's decision in Monell did was to relieve a municipal entity
of liability when an employee violates a federal right, thereby limiting the municipality's liability
to the entity's own wrongs. See SCHWART & KIRKUN, supra note 13, § 7.4. Since municipalities
are only artificial and can only act through their employees, the effect of the Court's holding seemed
to cloak municipalities with absolute immunity. Id.
59. Although the Court in Monel did in fact define municipal wrongs, it left other questions
unresolved regarding the meaning of municipal custom and policy and the situations in which their
enforcement would warrant the imposition of municipal liability. As a result, the Monel Court
refused to address "what the full contours... may be," leaving "further development of this action
to another day." Monel, 436 U.S. at 695.
60. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 812-14 (1985) (holding that a single act of
police misconduct was insufficient to justify a finding by the jury that the municipality had a policy
of inadequately training its police force); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (holding
that the municipality could only be found liable where the wrongdoer "possesse[d] final authority
to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered"); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 112, 128 (1988) (holding that a "city cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless [the
plaintiff] proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy"). See also George D. Brown,
supra note 52, at 884 (stating that "it is not an exaggeration to say that no one knows what 'official
policy' is.").
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By rejecting the well-settled common law tort doctrine of respondeat
superior,"' the Supreme Court failed to build upon other familiar common law
tort principles, such as causation and damages.62 Monell was a relatively
simple case because the municipality had adopted a policy that was facially
unconstitutional.' However, most cities do not ratify policies that are overtly
unconstitutional.' Rather, the more conventional case, such as the police
pursuit situation, arises where the constitutional deprivation occurs from the
application of otherwise valid policies.' In police pursuit cases where an
innocent bystander is injured by police conduct, the illegality results from the
application of the otherwise legal training techniques, and not from an actual
municipal policy of injuring innocent bystanders.'
In City of Canton v. Harris,67 the Court addressed a municipality's
liability under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations caused by the city's failure
to adequately train its police force. The Court repudiated the City of Canton's
argument that municipal liability can be imposed only in circumstances where
the challenged policy is itself unconstitutiona. 5 The Court concluded that
there are limited situations where an allegation of a failure to train can form the
61. The term respondeat superior has been interpreted to mean "that a master is liable in certain
cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent." See BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
62. See NAHMOD, supra note 41, § 6.07, at 350.
63. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 661 n.2 (1978). The
constitutional violation in Monell involved an expressly adopted policy requiring municipal
employees to take unpaid maternity leave. Id.
64. See, e.g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1388 (4th Cir. 1987) (declaring that in
practice, unconstitutional policies are rare, or at least rarely surface in litigation in this realm).
65. See Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (stating that the
evidence suggested a complete failure to train police officers in high speed pursuits); City of Miami
v. Harris, 490 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing a policy for high speed chases);
Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1988) (observing that the city was liable for
the inadequate training of its police force).
66. See supra note 65 and accompanying text discussing lower federal court decision regarding
a municipality's failure to adequately train.
67. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). In City of Canton, the plaintiff claimed a violation of her due process
right to receive necessary medical care while in the custody of police. Id. at 381. The plaintiff
alleged a claim of municipal liability for this violation based on a theory of grossly inadequate
training. Id. at 381. Additionally, the plaintiff presented evidence of a municipal regulation that
established a policy of giving shift commanders complete discretion to make decisions as to whether
prisoners were in need of medical care. Id. at 381-82. This was accompanied by evidence that shift
commanders received no training or guidelines to assist them in making these determinations. Id.
at 382.
68. Ciy of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387.
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basis for liability under § 1983.' In defining these limited circumstances, the
Court reasoned that a city can be held liable only where the failure to train
constitutes a deliberate indifference "to the rights of persons with whom the
police come into contact." 7' Additionally, a municipality can be held liable for
a failure to train only where the deficiency in training actually caused the
violation.7' In reaching its conclusion, the Court demonstrated that fault was
necessary to avoid exposing "municipalities to unprecedented liability."'
Consequently, the Court required a fault element to avoid placing "de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities."'
However, the Court cautioned that the deliberate indifference standard had
nothing to do with the culpability level required to establish the underlying
constitutional wrong.74 Instead, the deliberate indifference standard relates to
what is needed to show that the municipal policy is the "moving force" behind
the constitutional violation.75 Thus, in a § 1983 action, it appears that a
69. Id. But see Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 580 (4th Cir. 1989). In MitcheU, the court
espoused the view that City of Canton precludes municipal liability completely where the claim is
merely one "that state procedures were inadequate." Id. at 580. Therefore, it appears that pursuant
to Mitchell, a municipal policy's inadequacy can never comprise municipal liability.
70. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. To recover under a failure to train theory, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) the failure to train amounted to a deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact; and (2) that the municipality's policy actually
caused a constitutional injury. Id. at 389-90.
71. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 391-92 (1989). Although the Court requires
some degree of fault, the technicalities are still unclear. Despite stating deliberate indifference as
the degree of culpability needed under City of Canton, ambiguity still exists as to exactly what the
fault standard encompasses. Justice O'Connor was willing to recognize that municipal liability for
a failure to train might be established:
"[W]here it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern
of constitutional violations involving the exercise of police discretion.... [which] could
put the municipality on notice that its officers confront the particular situations on a
regular basis, and that they often react in a manner contrary to constitutional
requirements."
Id. at 397 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, lower courts have
assumed the task of determining what fault standard encompasses "deliberate indifference." See
Jones v. Chieffo, 833 F. Supp. 498, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("[To make out a claim of deliberate
indifference, plaintiffs must show that a municipality's policymakers were put on notice, whether
actually or constructively, of the need for a different policy, before they can be found to be
deliberately indifferent to that need.").
72. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989).
73. Id. at 392.
74. Id. at 389 n.8.
75. Id. at 379. On remand, the Court made it apparent that the plaintiff would have to identify
a particular deficiency in the training program and that the identified deficiency was the actual cause
of the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Id. at 391. It simply would not be enough to prove that a
particular officer was inadequately trained, nor that there was negligent administration of an
otherwise adequate program, nor that the officer's actions that caused the injury could have been
avoided by more thorough training. Id. Indeed, federal courts are not to become involved "in an
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municipality can escape liability if the plaintiff fails to meet the threshold
requirement of proving that the officer inflicted constitutional harm.76 Still, in
light of the Court's decision in City of Canton, lower federal courts remain
uncertain as to the level of culpability regarding the recognition of inadequate
training claims.'
endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs." Id. at 392.
76. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) (explaining that
damages could not be granted against a municipality when the jury determines that the officer did
not cause any constitutional harm). But see Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F. Supp.
1184, 1195 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that a municipality may be independently liable for violating
the plaintiff's constitutional rights, even in the absence of any constitutional wrongs inflicted on
behalf of the officer).
77. Many claims of inadequate training are asserted, but only a few are able to satisfy the
arduous City of Canton "deliberate indifference" and "direct cause" requirements. For decisions
rejecting inadequate training claims under City of Canton, see Evans v. City of Marlin, 986 F.2d
104, 108 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a city's failure to train police personnel to detect suicide
impulses does not give rise to a constitutional deprivation where detainee in a suicide case did not
manifest any signs that the detainee was a danger to herself); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d
386, 393 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the record was insufficient to support a jury question regarding
the inadequate training of the jail staff in a suicide prevention); Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087,
1097 (4th Cir. 1992) (asserting that in a detainee suicide case no deficiencies in training were
shown); Smith v. City of Joliet, 965 F.2d 235, 237 (7th Cir. 1992) (declaring that the plaintiff's
evidence was "woefully inadequate"); Medina v. City and Cty. of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1500
(10th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[flor purposes of defeating the [city's] summary judgment motion, the
[plaintiff's] evidence was inadequate as a matter of law"); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232,
240 (6th Cir. 1992) (contending that "where no constitutional violation exists for failure to take
special precautions [against a detainee's suicide], none exists for failure to promulgate policies and
to better train personnel to detect and deter jail suicides."); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504,
1512 (9th Cir. 1991) (maintaining that "the agents received highly specialized and extensive training
in arrest and SWAT procedures. The fact [that] the agents may not have been trained in every
conceivable hostile arrest scenario . . . would not render their training 'inadequate'"); Dwares v.
City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1993).
For decisions sustaining training claims under City of Canton, see Simmons v. City of
Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1074 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that "the record contains sufficient
evidence to support a section 1983 verdict against the City based on plaintiff's... theory that the
City violated [the plaintiff's] rights through a deliberately indifferent failure to train officers
responsible for intoxicated detainees in suicide detection and prevention."), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
985 (1992); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that
although the deputy sheriffs "may have had some training in the use of force, they received no
training in the constitutional limits of the use of force. [The] deprivation of plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment rights was a direct consequence of the inadequacy of the training the deputies
received."); Adujar v. Boston, 760 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D. Mass. 1991) (noting that the plaintiff
sufficiently pleaded the claim of inadequate training); Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320,
1325 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (stating that there were sufficient allegations of complete failure to train
police officers regarding "high speed pursuits"); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d
Cir. 1992); Jones v. Thompson, 818 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Waechter v. School District,
773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991); Doe v. Calumet City, 754 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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Because municipal liability, especially for isolated accidents arising out of
high-speed pursuits, is so difficult to establish under City of Canton, the most
commonly litigated § 1983 claim in police pursuit cases involves the injured
bystander who seeks to impose personal monetary liability on an individual
police officer.' However, government employees, including police officers,
who act in a tortious manner are often entitled to some form of immunity for
their actions." In the context of § 1983 litigation, the Supreme Court has held
that immunity can be either absolute or qualified, depending on the function
being performed.' While absolute immunity depends solely on an official's
special functions,8 ' qualified immunity is not only dependent upon status, but
also upon the conditions of the case. 2 With respect to pursuit situations, a
police officer may be able to defeat personal liability by alleging a defense of
qualified immunity.'
Under qualified immunity, state and local officials who perform their
executive and administrative functions without violating clearly established laws
are protected against § 1983 monetary liability in their personal capacities.'
78. The "great preponderance" of § 1983 actions name individual officers as defendants.
HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1249
(3d ed. 1988).
79. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at § 132.
80. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (declaring that "immunity analysis rests
on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant.").
81. See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201 (stating that "[a]bsolute immunity flows not from rank or
title or 'location within the Government,' but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual
official."). Generally, absolute immunity has been extended to legislators, prosecutors, and judges.
See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (recognizing absolute immunity for state
legislators); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (noting absolute immunity for prosecutors);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (identifying the defense of absolute immunity for judges).
The Supreme Court has also extended absolute immunity to certain officials in the executive branch.
These include federal prosecutors and similar officials, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509-
12 (1978); executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, id. at 513-17; and the President of
the United States, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
82. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that government officials are
protected from liability for civil damages as long as "their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
Furthermore, whether a government official's tortious conduct is afforded immunity turns on a
nebulous distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts. If the act is discretionary, then the
government official is immunized. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., supra note 18, at 1059-60.
83. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1987) (applying the doctrine of qualified
immunity to a suit against a law enforcement officer in his individual capacity); Medina v. City and
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992).
84. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993); Harlow v. Fitzsimmons, 457
U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
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The current doctrine of qualified immunity originated in Harlow v.
Fizgerald.85 In Harlow, the Court held that governmental officials executing
discretionary functions generally are protected from liability for civil damages
so long as their "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.""
However, a determination that a governmental official is entitled to qualified
immunity will not preclude an action against the municipality."
In short, the legislative history reveals that § 1983 enforces the Constitution
and does not encompass any substantive rights.' Moreover, Congress did not
intend the Civil Rights Act to include a state of mind requirement independent
of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.8 9
Thus, in any § 1983 claim, the aggrieved plaintiff must prove the requisite
culpability level for the particular constitutional right in order to show a
deprivation of that right. Since the constitutional right at issue within the
framework of police pursuits is substantive due process, the next section will
explore the actionability of governmental misconduct within the framework of
substantive due process.
85. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, a governmental employee brought a damage action
against several elite Presidential aides for the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Id. The suit
was brought pursuant to the Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than § 1983, because it was brought against federal government
officials.
86. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Even though the Court was dealing with a claim brought against
federal agents, the Court's holding is not confined to only those situations. Id. Clearly, the policies
underlying the opinion appear to be equally applicable to state officials as well.
87. There is no qualified immunity available to a municipality or other similar governmental
employers or policymaking individuals sued in their "official capacity" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1980). See also Ross v. Neff, 905
F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that an individual officer had qualified immunity for an
improper arrest on Indian land, but the county was still liable for its policy of allowing such arrests).
88. See Barker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (holding that § 1983 does not protect against anything,
rather it merely provides a remedy); LEVINSON & BODENSTEINERsupra note 14, at 11-45.
89. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-
35 (1981).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
A. Origins of Substantive Due Process and the Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights
Substantive due process is a nebulous doctrine that subsists in confusion.m
Essentially, the Due Process Clause gives rise to three distinct types of claims:
violations of provisions incorporated in the Bill of Rights- violations of the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause;92 and violations of the
90. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REv.
1044, 1044-46 (1984) (observing the substantive due process doctrine's "descent into uncertainty");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 309 (1993) (noting that the "concept of substantive due process
introduces further tensions, ambiguities, and ambivalence").
91. The rights incorporated by due process and made applicable to the states consist of the Bill
of Rights, excluding the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Third Amendment, the grand
jury and civil jury trial rights, the Ninth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. See Craig W.
Hillwig, Giving Property All the Process that Is Due: A "Fundamental" Misunderstanding About
Due Process, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 703, 711 (1992). Thus, the rights that are incorporated through
the Due Process Clause are substantive, such as first amendment rights. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (recognizing freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 707 (1931) (identifying the right to freedom of the press). Additionally, these incorporated
rights include rights that are procedural in nature as well, such as the criminal due process rights
contained in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (establishing the right to a criminal trial by jury); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (noting a defendant's right against self-incrimination). The standard for
determining whether the Constitution incorporates a right is if the right "is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49. See generally NOWAK ET AL., supra
note 7, at § 11.6 (discussing the incorporation of the Bill of Rights).
92. Substantive due process includes the right to privacy. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (recognizing the right of marriage); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 501-06 (1977) (establishing the right to order one's familial affairs); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973) (identifying a woman's right to have an abortion). Furthermore, the right
to receive certain minimum levels of medical treatment has also been recognized as a right of
substantive due process. See Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982).
Other privacy rights include the right to possess and use contraceptives, Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); the right to send one's child to a parochial school, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925); the right to have a child study a foreign language,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); the right to cohabitate with one's relatives, Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-06 (1977); and the right not to be sterilized, Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (although Skinner is an Equal Protection case, it identified
a fundamental right which also applies to substantive due process).
Additionally, even where fundamental rights are not implicated, the Due Process Clause
substantively protects against arbitrary government action. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399-400 (1923); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). Substantive due process also
ensures fundamental fairness, see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711
(1993), and guards against all arbitrary abuses of power. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 315 (1982) (holding that those committed to state mental institutions have a "historic liberty
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Procedural Due Process Clause. 93  Originally, the Due Process Clause
interest" in personal security that is protected by the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,227 (1990) (recognizing a liberty interest in avoiding
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
395 (1926) (holding that the plaintiffs could establish a substantive due process violation if the
government action affecting real property was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare").
93. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Primarily, the function of the Procedural
Due Process Clause is to "minimize the risk of erroneous decisions" by ensuring that government
proceeds in a way that protects the faithful implementation of its laws. See Greenholtz v. Inmates
of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 661-62 (2d ed. 1988). Procedural due process guarantees that
a fair decision-making process exists before the government undertakes a particular action which
directly impairs a person's right to life, liberty, or property. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 7, at
453. See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984), Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-
37 (1981); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970). Additionally, two models of procedural
due process exist: pre-deprivation and post-deprivation due process. See Thadd Llaurado,
Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S. C. § 1983-The Actionability of a Negligent Deprivation of a Liberty
Interest in Light of Daniels and Davidson, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 599, 626 (1986) (noting that the
"concept of due process incorporates notions of fair notice and warning").
Generally, for procedural due process causes of action, a two-step inquiry is involved: (a)
does the plaintiffhave a liberty or property interest; and (b) if so, what process is due? NOWAK Er
AL., supra note 7, at 453-83 (examining this two-step process). For instance, when an individual
asserts a procedural due process claim for a violation of a liberty interest, that individual must allege
that the government unlawfully interfered with a protected liberty interest by failing to provide
adequate procedural safeguards. See Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1984). Once
this liberty interest is identified, what process is due depends upon the outcome of a balancing test
delineated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The factors to balance include: (1) the
private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards,
and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden on the government
in providing the procedure demanded. Id. at 335. Currently, all courts must apply the Mathews
balancing test to determine the type of procedures that the Due Process Clause demands when
government action deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.
See generally Daniel S. Feder, From Parratt to Zinermon: Authorization, Adequacy, and Immunity
in a Systemic Analysis of State Procedure, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 845-46 (1990) (noting that
although "accuracy of decision making is the primary goal of [procedural due] process, the degree
of accuracy that a system is required to provide will be qualified by the burden of providing it").
Although not specifically delineated by the Supreme Court, two subcategories of due process
exist. As recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), there is a "regularized
deprivation" branch and a "random and unauthorized conduct" branch, as established in Parraut and
Hudson. Id. at 260-61. Under the "random and unauthorized" branch, when a "random and
unauthorized" action deprives an individual of a liberty or property interest, the state will be
constitutionally liable to the individual unless that state provides an adequate remedy. Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-42 (1981). Clearly, if an action by a government official is "random
and unauthorized," then the state cannot provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes
place because the state cannot foresee exactly when such a loss will occur. Thus, if the action is
"random and unauthorized," the state must provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Parrart,
451 U.S. at 541-44. Where the adequate post-deprivation remedy exists in state law, the
requirements of due process are satisfied; if no such remedy exists, then the deprivation will be
unconstitutional. Id. (citing'Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified, 545 F.2d
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contained in the Fourteenth Amendment did not have a substantive
component.' The clause addressed only procedures used by the government
to deprive persons of life, liberty, or property, and not the substantive
reasonableness of such deprivations.95
In fact, substantive due process did not exist until the 1890s, when the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause demands that violations of life,
liberty, or property be substantively reasonable.' Substantive due process
rights provide plaintiffs with a broad residual theory to challenge the root of
565 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978)); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
(1984) (observing that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under § 1983 when a
state's post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim's procedural due process rights).
94. It must be noted that the Constitution contains two Due Process Clauses. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which restricts state and local
governments, states that "No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which restricts
the federal government, provides that "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
95. Some commentators continue to advocate that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend to incorporate a substantive component into the amendment. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1978):
It is a bit embarrassing to suggest that a text is informative when so many, for so long,
have found it to be only evocative,... but there is simply no avoiding the fact that the
word that follows "due" is "process." No evidence exists that "process" meant
something different a century ago from what it is now-in fact as I've indicated the
historical record runs somewhat the other way-and it should take more than an
occasional aberrational use to establish that those who ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment had an eccentric divination in mind .. .. Familiarity breeds inattention,
and we apparently need periodic reminding that "substantive due process" is a
contradiction in terms-sort of like green pastel redness.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (stating that a state ban on marine
insurance policies by out-of-state companies violates substantive due process). Allgeyer was the first
Supreme Court decision to use substantive due process to strike down a state statute. See also
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (using substantive due process to invalidate state
economic assessments that it found to be severely restrictive of an individual's liberty to contract).
Substantive due process in the economic realm has been largely discredited because the
Supreme Court has elevated economic rights over personal rights, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study, 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978), and has essentially ignored the inequality in bargaining power
between employers and employees. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976) (stating that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill
advised personnel decisions). However, the core concepts of substantive due process, as a guarantor
against arbitrary, capricious abuses of government power, have never been rejected. See Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (noting that the guarantee of due process has been applied
to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property);
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("the Due Process Clause... bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions"); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)
("[t]he question ... is whether . . . the defendant acted arbitrarily.").
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governmental conduct.'e Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment is the
vehicle by which most of the Bill of Rights have been "incorporated" and made
applicable to the states." As to incorporated rights, substantive due process
violations are analyzed as a deprivation of the explicit right, and not as a
deprivation of substantive due process.' In addition to the fundamental
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, however, the Due Process Clause has
been the source of other rights which the Supreme Court has found to be
fundamental." °° Here, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause
97. See VINCENT R. FONTANA, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.8 (1990).
98. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). There have been two main contrasting
views espoused by members of the Supreme Court on the incorporation issue: the selective
incorporation/fundamental rights approach and the total incorporation approach. See generally Louis
Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
However, this distinction is beyond the scope of this note. The original incorporation case was
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), where the Court found that the free speech clause of
the First Amendment was applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 664. Through
the years, there has been a steady process of judicial incorporation of the Bill of Rights, with a few
exceptions, into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby deeming such rights as applicable to the states.
Moreover, the Court incorporates into the Fourteenth Amendment any guarantee which is
"fundamental in the context of the [judiciall processes maintained by the American states." Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968). Other courts have articulated the incorporation
standard as "basic in our system of jurisprudence," In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See
also Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. Ray. 929
(1965).
Today, all of the provisions of the First Amendment concerning freedoms of religion, see
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause), Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause), speech, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), press, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), assembly, see DeJongev. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937), and petition, see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), have been
deemed applicable to the states. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 7, at 385. In fact, of the first ten
amendments, only a few amendments have not been incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
These amendments include: the Second Amendment right to bear arms, see Quilici v. Village of
Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a city is free to totally ban the possession
of firearms within its borders because the Second Amendment does not apply to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied 464 U.S. 863 (1983). Cf.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1875); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886);
the Fifth Amendment grand jury clause, see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); and the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
99. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (holding that a § 1983 suit based on a
police brutality claim should have been framed as a Fourth Amendment "seizure," rather than a
substantive due process violation based on brutal, malicious conduct).
100. See Gilmere v. Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Brienen,
722 F.2d 360, 366 (7th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977), discussed the fact that a number of protections of substantive due process are not set forth
explicitly:
Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by
reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this
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creates certain rights that are not explicitly contained in the Bill of Rights."°'
Court's decision it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society.
Id. at 501-02 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961)).
101. These non-explicit rights, established in the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
have been categorized as "fundamental rights" and are afforded the highest level of constitutional
protection. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 7, at 367 (noting that fundamental rights are those rights
which are identified by the Court as having a value essential to individual liberty in our society).
Such fundamental rights include: the right to vote, see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), the
right to interstate travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to fairness
in the criminal process. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). Although the fundamental nature of the right to fairness in the criminal process
has not been the subject of specific litigation in the Court, the Court has at least implicitly
recognized this right. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (recognizing the right
to counsel during the first appeal); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (acknowledging the right
to a transcript in misdemeanor appeals); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (identifying the right
to legal materials and access to the courts). The right to procedural fairness is not explicit, but this
right is implied in decisions concerning procedural due process rights. See, e.g., Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 n.28 (1982); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747-48 (1982) (holding
that parental rights can only be terminated if the state shows evidence of parental unfitness by "clear
and convincing evidence").
Finally, there is a fundamental right to privacy which includes numerous versions of freedom
of choice in matters relating to an individual's personal life. This right to privacy has been held to
include rights to freedom of choice in marital decisions. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (identifying the right to marital privacy); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
The Court has also recognized the right of child bearing. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (notingthe right to purchase contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410U.S. 959
(1973) (recognizing the right to terminate a pregnancy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1952)
(noting the right of sterilization). Finally, privacy rights include the right to raise children. See,
e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
In addition to a fundamental liberty interest, certain "garden variety" liberty interests also
exist. These include the right to contract, the right to carry on interstate commerce, the right to own
property, the right to gain useful knowledge, the right to engage in life's useful occupations, the
right to worship God, and the right to be free from arbitrary action at the hands of government
officials. See Bullard v. Valentine, 592 F. Supp. 774, 776 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). Furthermore,
outside the privacy context, a number of non-privacy applications of substantive due process also
exist, mainly in the areas of economic regulation. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) (invalidating economic legislation found to be unduly restrictive on liberty); Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (recognizing that substantive due process imposes
limitations on the legislative branch of government by prohibiting the legislature from passing
arbitrary and capricious statutes that unduly interfere with an individual's rights).
However, non-privacy applications of substantive due process have also occurred in excessive
force cases (for prisoners, pretrial detainees, and mental patients), in academic decisions, and in the
area of public employment. Potentially, the substantive due process doctrine is applicable to
numerous, if not most, forms of governmental acts which deprive a person of life, liberty, and
property. See, e.g., United States v. Lutrell, 889 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting possible
substantive due process violations where, without reasonable grounds, police tempt law-abiding
citizens with an opportunity to engage in criminal conduct). But see Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d
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Most notably, however, where fundamental rights are not implicated, the
breadth of substantive due process still endures as an available theory to combat
arbitrary governmental conduct."'2
B. Scrutiny Rules
In analyzing Supreme Court decisions, a two-tiered categorical scheme
emerges to reflect the realities of substantive due process analysis. Within this
two-tiered framework, government intrusions on "fundamental" rights are
subject to strict scrutiny."m Strict scrutiny review requires the government to
demonstrate a compelling government interest and that the regulation used is no
more restrictive on these fundamental rights than is necessary."° Conversely,
violations of non-fundamental rights have been scrutinized to determine whether
the violations are rationally related to legitimate government purposes. 10 5 To
435, 439 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting a substantive due process challenge to a student's suspension from
high school under a rational basis test); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 359-63 (1st Cir. 1989)
(entertaining but ultimately rejecting substantive due process attacks on federal sentencing
guidelines); Reese v. Kennedy, 865 F.2d 186, 187-88 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a substantive due
process challenge to eviction from private homes under a "shocks the conscience" test).
102. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (holding that substantive due process
precludes arbitrary government action regardless of the procedures used to implement them).
Furthermore, some courts require that the plaintiff first identify a liberty or property interest before
triggering the guarantee against arbitrary government action. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 315
(noting that a property or liberty interest must first be identified because the due process clause
maintains that "[n]o state . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law") (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). See also Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d
1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990) (asserting that "[in order to state a cause of action for violation of the
Due Process Clause... [plaintiffs] must show that they asserted a recognized 'liberty or property'
interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . "); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d
1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988) (espousing the view that a liberty or property interest must be impaired
before the substantive component of the due process clause is triggered); Honore v. Douglas, 833
F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 1987) (declaring that in order to trigger the substantive due process clause,
an aggrieved plaintiff must first establish that the government arbitrarily and capriciously deprived
them of a protected property interest); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (1 th Cir. 1989)
(establishing that a plaintiff must show a federally protected property interest and that the
government stripped that interest by arbitrary and capricious means).
103. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 314.
104. Id. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
115 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,684-91 (1977).
Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (noting that "critical examination" is ordered
under the Equal Protection Clause when legislation encroaches on a fundamental right).
105. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984); Schweiker v. Wlson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981);
United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). See also Robert Bennett,
"Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L.
REv. 1049, 1049, 1054-55 (1979) (discussing the numerous formulas used to signify the
"rationality" requirement); Scott Bice, Raionality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV.
1, 30-31 (1980)
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fully comprehend the doctrine of substantive due process, it is essential to
distinguish between substantive due process challenges to rules and legislation
on the one hand and challenges to allegedly tortious governmental conduct on
the other.'06
In the context of rules and legislation, substantive due process analysis may
be more diverse than the simple distinction between "strict scrutiny" and
"rational basis."" For example, the Supreme Court has implied that state
laws that do not unduly burden "core liberty" interests should be sustained. lc
Additionally, comparable complexity emerges for legislation which affects non-
fundamental rights." 9 Under the traditional doctrine, legislation affecting non-
fundamental liberty and property rights need only have a rational basis to escape
invalidation by the courts. i0 The rational basis test reflects the principle that
legislation must aspire to promote legitimate government objectives,' and that
government must pursue its goals by reasonable means." 2 Generally, the
rational basis test is not demanding, and the degree of deference given to the
government is high," 3 especially when the challenged legislation regulates
106. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 90, at 315-29.
107. See Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163, 210-20 (1992)
(maintaining that "the Court has neither adhered in practice to its formal framework for analyzing
substantive due process claims nor applied a coherent standard of scrutiny in its departures").
108. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819-21 (1992) (noting that as long
as pre-viability abortions are not flatly forbidden, incidental restrictions do not trigger strict scrutiny
but are subject to an "undue burden" analysis). In Casey, the Court is careful not to characterize
abortion as a fundamental right; instead, the Court calls abortion a "core liberty" interest. Id.
109. See Fallon, supra note 90, at 315.
110. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1981);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976);
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
111. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein,
Naked Preferences and the Consitution, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1689, 1713-14 (1984) (stating that the
"Court has made clear ... that the government must be able to invoke some public value that the
classification at issue can be said to serve").
112. See, e.g., Schweiker, 450 U.S. 221 (espousing the view that the "pertinent inquiry is
whether [the challenged provision] advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion").
113. The high degree of deference that is given to the government is due to the difficulty of
enforcing the requirement that legislation reflect public purposes. See generally, DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (noting that
there are deep conceptual difficulties involved in identifying the "purposes" of multi-member
legislative bodies against which the rationality of means is to be measured). Occasionally, the
Supreme Court forgoes the effort to determine the "legislative purpose" and accepts any rationale
advanced by the state. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980) (asserting that "[wihere, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry
is at an end"); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960) (finding it "constitutionally
irrelevant" whether the reasoning "in fact underlay the legislative decision").
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economic relations in the private sector. 11 4 Furthermore, the burden of proof
is on the challenger, who must demonstrate that the law is totally arbitrary and
capricious, a standard which has never been met since the demise of Lochner v.
New York 115
In the context of unauthorized official acts, the Supreme Court has applied
substantive due process rules to administrative actions not explicitly sanctioned
by statute. 6 For instance, in Youngberg v. Romeo,"7 the Court held that
decisions made by state officials regarding the treatment of mentally handicapped
individuals will violate substantive due process if such decisions constitute a
"substantial departure from accepted professional judgement.""' Similarly,
the Court in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners"9 found a substantive due
process violation when state officials denied an applicant admission to the bar
without articulating any basis for their finding." ° Nevertheless, no recognized
framework has materialized for identifying when relatively isolated governmental
actions offend substantive due process, primarily concerning non-fundamental
114. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 279 (declaring that "strong deference [is]
accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy"); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 207-13 (1976) (expressing the view that deference to
governmental legislation is high because there are conceptual difficulties involved in recognizing the
"purposes" of multi-member legislative bodies against which the rationality standard is to be
measured).
115. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court determined that the "right to contract" was
protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause from arbitrary state legislation.
Id. at 53. Essentially, the Court determined that the state's interest, such as paternalism and the
redistribution of wealth, were not valid state interests; and consequently held that due process was
violated. Id. at 57. See also Levinson, supra note 7, at 321 (recognizing that 'the Supreme Court
has not invalidated a statute on substantive due process grounds where only economic rights are
implicated since the Lochnerean period") (citing G. DuNHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 472 (1 1th ed.
1985)).
116. Basically, substantive due process prohibits the government from interfering with our
liberty and property interests for reasons that are arbitrary or malicious. Originally, this limitation
was acknowledged with regard to legislative enactments. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-400 (1923) (invalidating a state statute which forbade children from being instructed in a
foreign language). Subsequently, the doctrine has been employed to protect against arbitrary and
egregious action by the executive branch. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (holding that decisions made by state officials
concerning the treatment of mentally incompetent individuals will be found to violate substantive due
process only if such decisions constitute a "substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base
the decision on such a judgment").
117. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
118. Id. at 323. See also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1976) (holding that
substantive due process is not violated by a prohibition concerning the dress code of police officers,
although "the citizenry at large has some sort of liberty interest in matters of personal appearance").
119. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
120. Id. at 239.
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liberty interests.' Thus, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court considers
the distinction between fundamental rights and non-fundamental rights applicable
in this context.
On one view, the Court has determined that government action that shocks
the conscience violates due process only when it deprives an individual of a
fundamental right.I22  However, the Court has never stated this
specifically."n It is unclear, for example, whether government action shocks
the conscience when it tramples upon a non-fundamental right, such as police
pursuit situations where an innocent bystander is injured. This confusion
regarding the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental rights, and
what standards applies to each, lends credence for the adoption of a more
objective standard which has been developed and molded within the framework
of substantive due process jurisprudence. Thus, the deliberate indifference
standard proposed by this Note will not only alleviate the confusion in the
courts, but will provide doctrinal uniformity for substantive due process
applications within the context of police pursuits."
Additionally, regarding non-fundamental liberty interests, the Supreme
Court has never articulated the proper breadth of a constitutional violation under
121. In cases involving what the Court has classified non-fundamental liberty and property
interests, the most accepted formulation implies that officials must not participate in "arbitrary"
conduct. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (observing that the "Due
Process Clause... was 'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government'") (quoting Hurtado v. California, I10 U.S. 516 (1884); Regents of the Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (noting that the "question . . . is whether . . . [the
defendant] acted arbitrarily . . . ."). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has certainly not held that
all arbitrary official conduct violates the Constitution. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226. In fact, one recent
case suggests that conduct could be arbitrary in a "constitutional sense" only if it shocked the
conscience. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069-70 (1992). The Court
has not implemented such a narrow view in the past, and has upheld substantive due process actions
without applying the "shocks the conscience" standard. See Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810,
1814-16 (1992); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785-87 (1992). In both of these cases, the
Court's substantive due process analysis avoided specific characterization of either the fundamental
nature of the interest involved or the standard of review applied.
122. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). See also Collins v. Harker Heights,
112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069-70 (1992) (quoting the Rochin standard as the test of constitutionality under
the Due Process Clause).
123. See Henry P. Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 991 & n.83 (1986) (proposing the question of whether
"excessive use of force by police officers constitute[s] a fundamental right case," according to
Rochin.).
124. See infra notes 257-307 and accompanying text (discussing the deliberate indifference
standard).
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the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of police pursuit claims."2 More
importantly, the Court has never determined a culpable state of mind
requirement for all violations of the Due Process Clause, especially for the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause." 6 In other words, the issue
is under what circumstances should an injury inflicted by a government official
rise to the level of a constitutional violation?"2 In fact, the Court has labored
to produce a doctrinal basis to trigger the protections of substantive due process
for arbitrary acts of government officials, and to exclude from the realm of
constitutional torts due process claims traditionally governed by common law
doctrine." Ensuing Supreme Court cases confused the lower federal courts'
125. See supra note 122-23 and accompanying text. Essentially, any life, liberty, or property
interest that the government restricts by law or takes away by an arbitrary action constitutes a
constitutional violation because the government was never bestowed constitutional authority to pass
such legislation or commit such an act. See NOWAK Er AL., supra note 7, at 418. More generally,
substantive due process violations comprise those acts by state officials that are prohibited
"regardless of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986). Therefore, because the substantive component of the Due Process Clause prevents
governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, a substantive due process claim
brought by an injured third party in a police pursuit situation will undoubtedly allege that the
government's conduct is inherently impermissible and arbitrary notwithstanding the procedures used
to implement these actions. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Madden v. City
of Meriden, 602 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (D. Conn. 1985); Ramos v. Gallo, 596 F. Supp. 833, 837
(D. Mass. 1984).
126. Although the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue, the Court has only stated that the
conduct of government officials that amounts to "mere negligence" does not violate the Due Process
Clause, because a violation of life, liberty, or property amounts to more than a "mere lack of due
care by a state official." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31, 334.
127. The term "constitutional tort" characterizes any action for damages for a deprivation of
constitutional rights against state and local defendants, normally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Marshall Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L.
REV. 277, 323-24 (1965), for the introduction of the term "constitutional tort." It has subsequently
been adopted by the Supreme Court as the descriptive term for cases brought under § 1983. See
Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); William Burnham, Separating
Constitutional and Common Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed Constitutional Theory of Duy,
73 MINN. L. REv. 515, 515 n.2 (1989). However, it is outside the scope of this note to define the
appropriate boundary between all the harms inflicted by government actors that amount to
constitutional violations and harms that constitute ordinary torts. The only importance that the
concept of constitutional torts has on this note is to help determine a culpable state of mind
requirement for police officers who injure innocent parties while engaged in pursuit of an alleged
offender. Although state legislatures and common law courts can alter or restrict a cause of action
arising under state statutes or common law, they cannot invalidate a plaintiff's right to recover
constitutional tort damages. See generally, Michael Wells & Thomas E. Eaton, Substantive Due
Process and The Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201 (1984).
128. Since the Supreme Court has undoubtedly held that § 1983 contains no state of mind
requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right,
it is important that a culpability level be determined. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-
30 (1986). See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (holding that, whether
substantive or procedural, the protections of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause
will be triggered by lack of due care by government officials).
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understanding of the appropriate reach of substantive due process and the state
of mind necessary to trigger the protections of substantive due process.'
C. Actionability of Governmental Misconduct Under the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Scope of Constitutional Torts
In the law enforcement framework, where many liberty interests are
implicated, the original test to determine whether there was a violation of
substantive due process was whether the government actor's conduct shocked the
conscience of the court." This test was first enunciated in Rochin v.
California.' In Rochin, the Supreme Court held that the pumping of a
suspect's stomach to acquire evidence violated the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause because it shocked the conscience, or constituted such brutal
force as to "offend even hardened sensibilities."'32 The Court determined that
this type of conduct violated the individual's right to personal security. 33
Thus, the Court found that the government's interest in obtaining incriminating
129. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 327 (1981); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (noting a concern that the Fourteenth Amendment
would become "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be
administered by the states"). See also David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary
View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 322-28 (1976), for a persuasive criticism of the Paul Court's
decision.
130. See, e.g., Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F. Supp. 1184, 1195 (M.D. Penn.
1994); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991); Madden v. City
of Meriden, 602 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (D. Conn. 1985); Ramos v. Gallo, 596 F. Supp. 833, 837
(D. Mass. 1984).
- 131. 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). In Rochin, police officers used force in compelling an
individual to swallow an emetic in order to make the individual regurgitate incriminating evidence.
Id. at 166. However, this decision provided little direction in determining when an official's use
of force was sufficiently outrageous as to constitute a constitutional violation. See Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (articulating factors to aid courts in determining when force
violated an individual's constitutional right to personal security).
132. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. The Court described this right as one of personal security. Id.
In determining that the conduct under consideration "shock[ed] the conscience," the Court used its
own foundational conscience to ascertain the constitutionality of the conduct. Apparently, the Court
relied on social norms to determine what constituted egregious conduct, because the Court stated that
the Due Process Clause protects those interests that are "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). This procedure is analogous to the analysis the Court used to decide whether
a right contained in the Bill of Rights was fundamental and was incorporated by the Due Process
Clause- of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (stating that the conduct
"offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses'") (quoting Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
133. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
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evidence did not outweigh the individual's interest in bodily integrity. "
Although the language in Rochin has been cited in several Supreme Court and
lower federal court decisions,'35 it has provided little guidance in determining
precisely when government officials' misconduct violates an individual's liberty
interest, constituting a violation of the Due Process Clause."
In cases related to the Procedural Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court
has held that the protections of the Due Process Clause are not invoked by a
lack of due care, whether procedural or substantive.'37 Therefore, these cases
stand for the proposition that negligent acts by governmental officials do not
invoke the protections of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.
In Daniels v. Williams" and Davidson v. Cannon,139 the Supreme Court
breathed new life into the theory of substantive due process by reaffirming the
fundamental idea that the Due Process Clause embraces a substantive component
which enjoins arbitrary governmental actions, regardless of the fairness of.the
134. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171-74 (considering society's interests, which "push in opposite
directions").
135. Numerous courts of appeals have applied the "shocks the conscience" standard when
presented with substantive due process challenges. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296,
1303 (3d Cir. 1994); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 657 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 90 (1993); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 127
(1993); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 1992); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham,
963 F.2d 1481, 1486 (1 1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993); Cannonv. Taylor, 782
F.2d 947, 950 (1lth Cir. 1986); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying
"shocks the conscience" standard to police pursuit cases); Searles v. SoutheasternPa. Transp. Auth.,
990 F.2d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 1993). See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)
(noting that substantive due process precludes government officials from participating in conduct that
"shocks the conscience"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (1992) (holding that the "city's alleged failure to train its employees,
or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an omission that can properly be characterized as
arbitrary, or conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense").
136. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1308 (declaring that the "shocks the conscience" test is "amorphous
and imprecise"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (referring to the "shock the
conscience" standard as "indefinite and vague"). Calling for the dismantling of the test, Justice
Scalia stated: "If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved)
'shocks' the dissenters' consciences . . . perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their
consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of 'conscience-shocking' as a legal test." Herrera v.
Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 875 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (asserting that "[w]ith a 'shocks the conscience' test of constitutionality,
citizens must guess what is the law, guess what a majority of nine judges will believe fair and
reasonable"); Rochin, 342 U.S. 179 (concluding that Rochin's holding "is to make the rule turn not
on the Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here") (Douglas, J., concurring).
137. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).
138. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
139. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
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procedures used to implement them.' 40 In Daniels,' 4' the Supreme Court
140. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331. However, before Daniels, the Supreme Court addressed the
actionability of government official misconduct in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Parratr
was one of the Supreme Court's first efforts to address the culpability level necessary to trigger the
protections of the due process clause. In Parratt, an inmate at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex ordered a hobby kit, valued at $23.50, by mail. Id. at 530. After delivery, the kit was
negligently lost by prison officials, and the prisoner filed a § 1983 action for damages. Id. The
prisoner's claim was simple and straight forward; he asserted that he had been deprived of property
without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court first addressed the question of whether negligence was actionable under § 1983.
Parran, 451 U.S. at 532-34. The Court ruled that although § 1983 does not require scienter, the
state of mind is relevant to the underlying constitutional violation asserted through § 1983. Id. at
534. These parts of the opinion are sound. See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and
the "Background"of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974). The Court held that the plaintiff's loss,
though only negligently caused, was a deprivation of property, which implicated the Due Process
Clause. Parrat, 451 U.S. at 534-36, 543.
For years following the Parratr decision, lower courts contested whether the Court intended
that § 1983 would provide a remedy that was a result of simple negligence. Thus, most courts
concluded that simple negligence would not support certain § 1983 claims because there was an
absence of an underlying constitutional violation. See Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582,
584 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that simple negligence was not enough to support a § 1983 action);
Mills v. Smith, 565 F.2d 336, 340 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (same). But see Easton v. City of Boulder,
776 F.2d 1441, 1447 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Parrat for the proposition that negligence will satisfy
a claim under § 1983); Kidd v. O'Neil, 774 F.2d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Lowe v.
Letsinger, 772 F.2d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately concluded that the defendants' conduct did not amount to
a violation of the Due Process Clause because an adequate tort remedy existed under state law to
seek redress. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981). (noting that the state of Nebraska
provided respondent with a means under which he could have sought redress for the violation).
Thus, the plaintiff failed to show that the deprivation was without due process. Id. at 544.
The Court concluded that the remedies that were provided by the state could have compensated
the respondent for the loss he suffered; and therefore held "that they [were] sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process." Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell was of the view that
negligent acts could not constitute deprivations within the meaning of the Due Process Clause;
instead, only intentional acts could violate due process. Id. at 550 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Eventually, this view captured a majority of the Court. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
329-31 (1986).
Parrat is a source of confusion and has been subject to much debate. See, e.g., Monaghan,
supra note 123, at 979 (noting that "Parratt v. Taylor is among the most puzzling Supreme Court
decisions of the last decade, and lower federal courts have been thrown into considerable confusion
in their efforts to implement it"). While the Parratt Court characterized the inmate's complaint as
one involving procedural due process, it appears that the inmate was not challenging the absence of
some type of hearing relating to the loss of his property. Instead, the inmate was arguing that the
officials should not have lost his property at all. Thus, Parrat encompassed a challenge to the fact
of the property loss, not to the lack of procedures. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Due Process, State
Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 KAN. L. REv. 217, 226 (1985). See also Burnham, supra note
127, at 521-22 (noting that the Parrat Court "reasoned that prior notice and hearing are impossible
when random and unauthorized governmental action, whether intentional or negligent, causes losses
of liberty, or property") (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). As a result, there can
be no constitutional violation unless there is an absence of an adequate state remedy. Hudson, 468
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held that the Due Process Clause is not implicated by a negligent act of a
government official. 42 However, the Court specifically left unanswered the
U.S. at 532-33; Palmer, 451 U.S. at 541-42.
Still, Parrau stands for the proposition that a negligent deprivation of a person's property by
government officials constitutes a violation of due process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536,
543 (1981). See Levinson, supra note 7, at 333 (espousing the view that the Parraa Court redefined
the claim from a substantive due process claim to a procedural due process claim). Professor
Levinson further states that a procedural violation claim is absurd when an inmate asserts that he had
a right to a hearing before his property was negligently lost. Id. See also Burnham, supra note
127, at 521 n.30 (asserting that Parran changed what would have been substantive due process
claims into procedural due process claims, leaving to substantive due process only those violations
that "were so outrageous that no amount of process would cure them").
Viewing Parran as a procedural due process case, the issue was whether Nebraska's provision
of a post-deprivation remedy for the inmate's loss defeated his claim of a procedural violation.
Previous due process cases had established that, subject to limited exemptions, the state was
obligated to provide a hearing before it worked a deprivation of property. Parran, 451 U.S. at 540.
In Parrait, however, the Court reasoned that because the negligent act of the state official was
random and unauthorized, the State could not accurately predict when the loss would occur;
therefore, it "is difficult to conceive how the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the
deprivation takes place." Id. at 541. Thus, the Court reasoned that where a state actor works an
unauthorized deprivation, the lack of pre-deprivation process will not inevitably render a deprivation
unconstitutional. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) (noting that a
deprivation must be unauthorized in order for post-deprivation remedies to be relevant under
Parrau). However, where an unauthorized action deprives a person of her property, the state will
be constitutionally liable to the property owner unless the state provides an adequate remedy.
Parran, 452 U.S. at 541-42. As a result, it appears that the key to Parran is the established state
procedure/random, unauthorized acts dichotomy, rather than the intentional/negligent distinction.
There has been much debate regarding the question of whether Parrau involved a substantive
due process claim or a procedural due process claim. This debate, although provocative, remains
outside the scope of this note.
141. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In Daniels, an inmate slipped on a pillow which a deputy sheriff
negligently left on a stairway. Id. at 328. The inmate brought a § 1983 action in federal court,
alleging that he had been deprived of a liberty interest in freedom from bodily injury in violation
of due process of law. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted, 748
F.2d 229 (1984) (en bane).
142. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 (concluding that the "Due Process Clause is simply not
implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
property"). The Court's rationale was the fear of making the Fourteenth Amendment "a font of tort
law." Id. at 332 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
Concentrating on cases alleging a bare Fourteenth Amendment violation instead of a claim of
injury within a specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights, the Court has attempted to distinguish
between conduct that only gives rise to a common law tort claim and conduct that gives rise to a
constitutional tort claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 346-48
(1986) (noting that a prisoner's procedural due process claim was insufficient because negligence
cannot give rise to a constitutional deprivation); Pau, 424 U.S. at 699-701 (1976) (observing that
defamation by a police chief did not deprive plaintiff of a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause). One of the Court's approaches to distinguish between constitutional torts and
common law tort claims has been to examine the claimed injury and to deny that it is an interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 699-701, 710-12 (concluding that
not all torts committed by state officials rise to the level of constitutional tort). Another approach
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question of whether something less than intentional conduct was necessary, or
whether conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence is enough to invoke
the protections of.the Due Process Clause."0
In the companion case of Davidson v. Cannon," the Court stated that the
official's failure to exercise reasonable care caused a serious injury, but this lack
of care did not approach the type of invidious government conduct that would
invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause." The Court emphasized
that the word "deprive"'" means more than simple negligence, it demands that
plaintiffs show "an affirmative abuse of power."' 47 To support his narrow
definition of deprivation, Justice Rehnquist considered the history of the Due
Process Clause.'" He stated that in analyzing history, the "guarantee of due
process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property."' 49 Moreover, he noted that
history indicates that the Due Process Clause protects individuals from the
used by the Supreme Court to restrict the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment has been to find the
existence of a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but to conclude that due process was
provided. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682-83 (1977) (recognizing that students
had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom from unjustified invasions of their bodily
security, but finding that the availability of state remedies satisfied the due process requirement).
143. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986). In Daniels, the Court gave no real
reason for its conclusion that due process demands more than simple negligence. Instead, the Court
spoke of abuses of power and fundamental fairness, never convincingly explaining why negligence
could not be an abuse, or why it could not be unfair. Id. at 331-32. Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Marshall took the position that, under a few circumstances, gross negligence, recklessness, or
deliberate indifference can give rise to a due process claim. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
349 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 356-58 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Today,
this question remains unanswered. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 198 n.10 (1989).
144. 474 U.S. 344 (1986). In Davidson, a prisoner was attacked by another inmate after
notifying prison officials that this inmate had threatened him with physical force. Id. at 345-46.
Davidson argued that the prison officials' failure to take reasonable steps to protect him from injury
deprived him of his "liberty interest in personal security." Id. at 346.
145. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347-48.
146. Concurring in both Daniels and Davidson, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority on
the issue of what is a deprivation. Justice Stevens embraced the view that "deprivation" identified
the victim's infringement or loss, not the actor's state of mind. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
341 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in Daniels and Davidson). According to Stevens,
the harm to the prisoner was the same regardless of whether 'a pillow is left on a stair negligently,
recklessly, or intentionally." Id.
147. Id. at 330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). In his dissent, Justice Brennan espoused the belief that negligence should not be
actionable, however, the facts in Davidson sufficiently established recklessness or deliberate
indifference which establishes a cause of action. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
149. Id. (citations omitted).
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arbitrary exercise of governmental powers.'" Thus, without an affirmative
abuse of power by a government official, a plaintiff should not have a federal
forum. 151
Daniels and Davidson make it clear that negligent conduct cannot cause a
deprivation of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause, regardless of the
severity of the injuries.'52 Additionally, the Court in Davidson interpreted
Daniels as holding that negligent conduct cannot violate either procedural due
process or substantive due process. 53 Since Daniels and Davidson determined
only that the Due Process Clause does not encompass negligent governmental
conduct," these decisions inevitably leave open a number of important
questions, such as what other types of governmental conduct will rise to the
level of a constitutional violation."5 In addition to the Due Process Clause,
the Court left open the likelihood that there are other constitutional provisions
150. Id.
151. Id. at 330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). However, some courts have held that the Due Process Clause protects against
"negative" liberty deprivations based on a right to be left alone, not "positive" liberty deprivations,
based on the right to receive protective services. See, e.g., Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 510
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Bill of Rights is 'a charter of negative liberties') (citing Bowers v.
DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982)).
152. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328; Davidsonv. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
153. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348 (asserting that the "protections of the Due Process Clause,
whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials").
In Daniels, Justice Rehnquist mentioned that the Due Process Clause not only required procedural
fairness, but also guarded against oppressive conduct. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (citing Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856) (discussing due
process under the Fifth Amendment)).
154. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). According to Daniels and Davidson, if
the contested conduct is intentional, it is "not necessary for the district court to make any other state
of mind finding." Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1105 (3d Cir. 1986). "We know of no
authority for the proposition that an intentional deprivation of life, liberty or property does not give
rise to a due process violation because the failure to provide due process was without fault." Id.
It must be noted that the no-negligence rule delineated in Daniels and Davidson does not
impose a scienter or other culpability requirement nullifying the professional judgment standard
delineated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1987), which is utilized to determine the
constitutional rights of involuntarily committed mental patients. Estate of Conners v. O'Connor,
846 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). Conversely, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the no-negligence due process rule applies to claims asserted by involuntarily
committed mental patients because there is no "Youngberg exception to Daniels." Feagley v.
Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437, 1440 (5th Cir. 1989).
155. The Daniels Court failed to resolve whether "something less than intentional conduct,"
was necessary, or whether recklessness, gross negligence, or deliberate indifference was enough to
invoke the protections of due process. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3. Refuting Petitioner's
argument that culpability levels such as willful, wanton, and gross negligence are subtle distinctions
that even puzzle scholars, the Court noted that the difference between negligence and intent is
"abundantly clear;" and therefore, declined to "trivialize the Due Process Clause in an effort to
simplify constitutional litigation." Id. at 335.
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that may be violated by a government official's lack of care."8 Not
surprisingly, these cases have generated an abundance of important lower court
litigation regarding the culpability of governmental misconduct. 117  Most
notably, however, in the lower federal courts, abusive police misconduct in the
area of police pursuits has invoked a tide of substantive due process claims,
particularly where no specific provision of the Bill of Rights is applicable."
Specifically, in pursuit cases, lower federal courts are assiduously struggling to
determine the culpability level necessary to invoke the protections of the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS:
THE ACTIONABILrrY OF POLICE MISCONDUCT IN PURSUIT CASES
A. The Shocks the Conscience Standard
Routinely, police officers use their vehicles to pursue individuals who flee
when the police signal them to stop. All too often, these pursuits end only when
drivers, passengers, or other innocent bystanders are either severely injured or
killed. 59 When these injured parties seek compensation for the harm caused
by the pursuit, they claim that the police officers violated their liberty interests
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
Yet, the Supreme Court has never precisely articulated factors for determining
when acts by police officers or other government officials rise to the level of a
156. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334.
157. The majority of lower courts have taken the position that Daniels and Davidson require
that there be an "element of deliberateness in directing misconduct toward the plaintiff" before the
Due Process Clause is invoked. See, e.g., Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 227
(1st Cir. 1990) (recognizing a recklessness or callous indifference standard); Harris v. Maynard, 843
F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988) (observing the standard of wanton or obdurate disregard or
deliberate indifference); Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that
"some reckless acts may constitute due process violations while others may not"). But see
Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (asserting that
recklessness is not enough). See also Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir. 1990).
The Archuleta court noted that mere callousness or excessive zeal which amounts to an abuse of
official power may not be enough to establish liability for a due process claim in the absence of the
requisite scienter. Id. Therefore, a bystander who witnessed police action but was not himself
subjected to that action cannot assert the kind of deliberate deprivation of rights needed to support
a due process claim. Id.
158. See infra notes 159-211 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (providing statistics regarding police pursuits).
160. See, e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1989); Jones
v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1987); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 948 (1 1th
Cir. 1986); Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 192-95 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
Typically, these actions are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, it is axiomatic that § 1983
"is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred." See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
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substantive due process violation. ' In fact, the lower federal courts are
divided regarding the appropriate culpability level necessary to trigger the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause. 62 When considering police
pursuits where an innocent bystander is injured, lower federal courts have
applied numerous tests to determine whether the officer's conduct violated the
bystander's substantive due process rights.6 3 Regularly, these courts have
applied standards such as shocks the conscience, 1" recklessness,' 6 and gross
negligence.l" An examination of these cases will demonstrate how the lower
federal courts have attempted to resolve this complex area of substantive due
process jurisprudence.
161. See, e.g., Daniels v. Davidson, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (reserving the question of
"whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,' is
enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause").
However, in contrast to claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has articulated factors for personal security claims brought under the Fourth Amendment, Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (noting that "all claims that law enforcement officers have
used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure'
of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard,
rather than under a 'substantive due process' approach"), and the Eighth Amendment, Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding that if prison officials showed "deliberate indifference"
to an inmate's medical needs, such indifference would offend "evolving standards of decency"
contrary to the Eighth Amendment). Currently, substantive due process challenges to the deliberate
use of excessive force can only occur in cases involving the treatment of pretrial detainees. See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (concluding that it is apparent "that the Due Process Clause protects
a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment").
Additionally, until the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, various circuit court
opinions applied the "shocks the conscience" standard to excessive force claims. See, e.g., Justice
v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Hinojoss v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223 (5th
Cir. 1988); Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1987); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913
(2d Cir. 1987); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923
(9th Cir. 1987); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986); Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d
1533 (11 th Cir. 1986); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1986); Owens v. Atlanta,
780 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986); Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986); New v.
Minneapolis, 792 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1986); Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir.
1986); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir. 1985); Fundiller v. Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436
(11th Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (recognizing that
"substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the
conscience'..."). See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DuKE
L.J. 692.
162. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting cases demonstrating the split in the
federal circuits).
163. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing the various standards lower
federal courts have used to determine whether governmental conduct rises to the level of a
substantive due process violation).
164. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).
165. See Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992).
166. See Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Recently, in Fagan v. City of Vineland," the Third Circuit, en banc,
addressed the question of when the conduct of police officers or other
government employees violates the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause in police pursuit cases. " On rehearing, the Fagan court held that due
process would be violated only if the pursuing officer's conduct "amounts to an
abuse of official power that shocks the conscience." 1" Although the court was
cognizant of the undefined and ambiguous inquiry that the shocks the conscience
test entails, the court concluded that it was bound to follow such a standard"m
because it was unanimously reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Collins v. City
of Harker Heights.'7 ' Furthermore, in defining the narrow reach of its
holding, the court stressed that the application of the reckless disregard standard,
which the court had uniformly applied in the past for determining substantive
167. 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). Fagan involved a high speed police chase that
resulted in a collision between a vehicle driven by the suspect and a vehicle driven by an innocent
passerby. Id. at 1300. As a result of the collision, innocent bystanders were killed. Id.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought a damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that various
Vineland police officers violated their substantive due process rights by recklessly conducting a high
speed pursuit in violation of the Attorney General's guidelines. Id. at 1301.
168. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1303. Earlier, the original panel of Fagan was divided on the issue
of the standard for liability under section 1983 for substantive due process violations in police
pursuit cases. The majority held that the applicable standard is whether the police officers acted
with a "reckless indifference" to public safety. Id. at 1302. On the other hand, the dissent took the
position that substantive due process is violated only by conduct that "shocks the conscience." Id.
169. Id. at 1303 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1992). See
also Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1172 (1992); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fagan court noted
that the "shocks the conscience" test applies to situations where the government official's conduct
was an affirmative act and where the injury was caused by the governmental actor's omission.
Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1304.
170. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that the
standard of reckless indifference is not a sufficient basis upon which to hold police officers liable
for a police pursuit under the Due Process Clause). See also Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853,
876, 878-79 (1993) (recognizing that the execution of an innocent defendant is conduct that is more
shocking than stomach pumping in Rochin) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992). In Collins, the widow of a city sanitation worker who died of
asphyxia argued that the city violated her husband's substantive due process rights. Specifically, she
alleged that the city violated the Due Process Clause by exposing her husband to unreasonable risks,
manifesting deliberate indifference to his safety, failing to train its employees about the dangers of
working in sewer lines and manholes, not providing safety equipment at job sites, and not providing
safety warnings. Id. at 1063. In finding that there was no due process violation, the Supreme Court
stressed that Collins' "claim is analogous to a fairly typical state law tort claim" and that it had
"previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal
duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law." Id. at 1070. The Court
declared that substantive due process principles are implicated only by actions or omissions "that
can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense." Id.
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due process violations,'?' was limited to cases where the victim was in
custody." Undoubtedly, the court was hesitant to expand the concept of
substantive due process to police pursuit cases because of the Supreme Court's
repeated warnings against liberal interpretations of the Due Process Clause. " 4
Thus, in the Third Circuit, Fagan stands for the proposition that the shocks the
conscience standard is the constitutional touchstone against which substantive due
process violations in police pursuit cases should be measured. "
Conversely, the dissent in Fagan contended that reckless indifference is the
appropriate standard for determining substantive due process violations in police
pursuit cases." 6  In reaching its conclusion, the dissent argued that the
majority's reliance on the shocks the conscience standard delineated in Collins
v. City of Harker Heights was misplaced." The dissent noted that the Collins
172. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1303 (stating that "with the exception of one recent case, the opinions
of this court have routinely used reckless indifference as the standard by which the courts should
determine whether the conduct of police or other governmental employees violates the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution').
173. Id. at 1306 (noting that although it could be said "that the judicial conscience is shocked
by a governmental employee's reckless disregard of the constitutional rights of an individual in
custody, [custody cases] are not analogous... to the police pursuit cases"). Moreover, the Fagan
court observed that the application of the "reckless indifference" standard is not applicable because
it is "grounded in tort law, not in constitutional principles." Id. at 1306-07. See also Temkin v.
Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 721 (4th Cir. 1991) (asserting that "the standard of care
owed in the context of incarceration is of limited value [in police pursuit cases]"). But see Medina
v' City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (relying on a custody case when
adopting the "reckless intent" standard for police pursuit cases) (relying on Harris v. Maynard, 843
F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988)); Fallon, supra note 90, at 324 (espousing the view that "no agreed
framework has emerged for identifying when relatively isolated official acts offend substantive due
process, [although] [t]he Court has established that conscience-shocking violates due process").
174. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994) (declaring that the
Fagan court "cannot ignore the Supreme Court's repeated warnings against an overly generous
interpretation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause") (citing Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (1992)); Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994).
See also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[tihe
Supreme Court has insisted upon caution and restraint in courts' application of substantive due
process").
175. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1304. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1809 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 879 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1309, (Cowen, J., dissenting, joined by Becker, Scirica, and
Lewis)(disagreeing with the proposition that the "'conscience-shocking' conduct is the only conduct
that constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation. . . ."). Additionally, the dissent acknowledged that
conduct that "shocks the conscience" more than satisfies any constitutional standard "whereby a
deprivation can be found," but also adhered to the belief that "reckless indifference" is the
appropriate standard in police pursuit cases. Id. at 1309.
177. Id. at 1311-12 (noting that the focus of Collins "on the lack of a constitutional duty on the
part of the city . . . for without such a duty there cannot be a claim under § 1983 against the city
for a violation of substantive due process"). Moreover, the dissent argued that Collins did not
"establish a 'shocks the conscience'" test; but instead, repudiated the proposition that "the Federal
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decision referred to the phrase "shocks the conscience" only once, and when the
phrase was used, the Court combined it with the word "arbitrary. '7 Thus,
Collins indicates that conscience-shocking conduct or arbitrary conduct would
be enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Ostensibly,
the dissent declared that the Collins holding was narrowly defined to include
only those situations where the government's conduct constituted an omission
instead of a deliberate action.I1°
The dissent's treatment of Collins suggests that not all unauthorized
deprivations of liberty and property by governmental officials constitute a
substantive due process violation.'' Rather, only those deprivations in which
the duties of care created by the Due Process Clause are breached constitute a
substantive due process violation."n Further, the dissent declared that the
Supreme Court has never applied the shocks the conscience test in a § 1983
Constitution imposes a duty on the city to provide its employees with minimal levels of safety in the
work place." Id. at 1311. See also D.R. and L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that after Collins, the Third Circuit stated that
"in DeShaney the Supreme Court rejected the 'shock the conscience' test of Rochin . . .").
Additionally, the dissent claimed that "[w]hile it is clear conduct that 'shocks the conscience'
satisfies the 'intentional conduct' standard endorsed by the Supreme Court," to make this conduct
a necessary standard would, in certain circumstances, compel more than "intentional conduct." See
Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1319 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
178. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1312. See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct.
1061, 1070 (1992) (noting "that the city's alleged failure to train its employees, or to warn them
about known risks of harm, was an omission that can[not] properly be characterized as arbitrary,
or conscience-shocking, in a constitutional sense").
179. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1312. (emphasis added).
180. Id. at 1312 (concluding that "the Collins Court characterized the city's conduct as a mere
omission") (Cowen, J., dissenting). In addition, the Third Circuit, in Searles v. Southeastern Pa.
Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993), used the "shocks the conscience" test to reject the
plaintiffs' argument that the "Constitution imposes a duty on a municipal transit authority to provide
its passengers with minimal levels of safety and security. .. ." Id. at 792. Thus, the Collins and
Searles decisions support the dissent's argument that the "shocks the conscience" standard is limited
to situations where harm is caused by governmental omission.
However, the majority rejected any attempt to limit the reach of Collins to only circumstances
where the government's conduct constituted an omission. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1304 (concluding that
when the Supreme Court proclaimed the "shocks the conscience" standard, it intended no distinction
between the application of the test to "situations where the government officials' affirmative act is
the direct cause of the constitutional harm and those where the harm is caused by governmental
omission").
181. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1314 (3d Cir. 1994) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
182. Id. at 1314 (contending that in the absence of a constitutional duty on the part of
governmental employees, "there was no need to establish any test for the appropriate standard of
care"). See also Burnham, supra note 127, at 548-54.
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action. "n Still, what remains unclear is whether the shocks the conscience
standard is applicable to § 1983 actions, and whether such a standard is confined
only to those situations where the government has failed to take action. "'
In addition to Fagan, other federal circuits and lower courts have held that
in police pursuit cases, substantive due process principles are implicated only by
conduct that shocks the conscience.l" For instance, in Temkin v. Frederick
County Commissioners,"s the court held that the plaintiff's due process claim,
which alleged that the car she was driving was struck by the vehicles of a
fleeing suspect and the pursuing officer, was governed by the shocks the
conscience test."n The court characterized the officer's conduct as "disturbing
and lacking in judgment," but falling short of conscience-shocking." s
Justifying its application of the shocks the conscience standard, the court relied
183. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1311 (noting that there exists "no precedent for any 'shocks the
conscience' test in a § 1983 case for the Supreme Court to pay homage.. ."). The dissent observed
that if the "shocks the conscience" standard has any remaining viability, it should be limited to
"criminal cases where the exclusion of evidence is at issue." Id. at 1316. Furthermore, the "shocks
the conscience" test was rejected in "cases that most closely resembled the facts of the Rochin case."
Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). In
determining that the "shocks the conscience" standard was inapplicable, the dissent espoused the
view that the phrase was first employed in Rochin in 1952, before the "Fourth Amendment was
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment." Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1311 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961)).
184. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (1992) (holding that the
Court is "not persuaded that the city's alleged failure to train its employees, or to warn them about
known risks of harm, was an omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience-
shocking, in a constitutional sense").
185. See, e.g., Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs., 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991);
Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986); Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F.
Supp. 1184, 1195 (M.D. Penn. 1994). For applications of the "shocks the conscience" standard
outside the framework of police pursuit cases, see Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 657
(6th Cir. 1993) (subjecting police academy cadets to a surprise urinalysis test), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 90 (1993); Colemanv. Wirtz, 745 F. Supp. 434, 443 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Reese v. Kennedy, 865
F.2d 186, 187-88 (8th Cir. 1989) (irvolving police officers' forced eviction of the plaintiff from her
home).
186. 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1991). In Tenan, a police officer who observed a car spinning
its wheels as it left a gas station pursued the vehicle with its lights and sirens activated. Id. at 718.
Although the officer was informed during the course of the ensuing pursuit that the driver had only
stolen $17.00 worth of gas, the pursuit reached speeds ranging from 65 to 105 miles per hour over
"a narrow, two-lane highway traversing an area of varying population," which ended when both
drivers lost control over their vehicles, causing "severe and permanent injuries" to an innocent
bystander. Id.
187. Id. at 720. The Temkin court noted that although the Fourth Circuit had not embraced the
"shocks the conscience" standard in the past, it had adopted such a test in another context. Id. at
721 (citing Weller v. Department of Social Serv., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
an agency's act of removing an abused child from his father's home "does not shock the conscience
188. Id. at 723.
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on other circuit courts which had scrutinized the substantive due process issue
in police pursuit cases. '" Additionally, while the Temkin court adopted a
shocks the conscience standard for police pursuit situations, it retained the
deliberate indifference standard for custody cases."' Apparently, the court
was persuaded by dicta contained in earlier Supreme Court cases... which
stated that cases involving automobile accidents would not invoke the Due
Process Clause merely because one of the drivers is a government official."
Similarly, in Checki v. Webb,'9 the Fifth Circuit stated that the action of an
unmarked police car in tailgating a driver who had accelerated to speeds in
excess of one hundred miles per hour in response to the officer's approach did
not alone raise any substantive due process claims."9 However, the court
declined to grant the defendant police officers summary judgment because after
the car was finally stopped, one of the pursuing officers struck the bystander
with his revolver."9 In its application of the shocks the conscience standard,
189. See, e.g., Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that negligent
or even grossly negligent conduct is not enough to constitute a cause of action for a violation of a
federal right); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
pursuing officer's "conduct does not rise to the level of gross negligence and, therefore, most
certainly does not rise to the level of conduct which would sustain a claim under section 1983");
Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the police officers' conduct in
pursuing the suspect did not rise to the level of gross negligence or outrageous conduct necessary
to sustain a § 1983 claim); Walton v. Salter, 547 F.2d 824, 825 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an
isolated act of negligence, even if willful and wanton, failed to state a § 1983 claim). In a somewhat
cursory fashion, the Temkin court assiduously adhered to the conclusion that Cannon, Roach, Jones,
and Walton, considered together, stand for the proposition that the "shocks the conscience" standard
should be applied to "'chase cases' involving the police." See Temkin, 945 F.2d at 723.
Undoubtedly, the Temkin court's treatment of these cases justified its adoption of a standard higher
than "recklessness" or "gross negligence." Cf. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1327 (3d
Cir. 1994) (stating that Cannon and Roach "have held that gross negligence is not sufficient" to
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause).
190. Temkin, 945 F.2d at 721 (noting that the "deliberate indifference" standard is limited to
incarceration cases).
191. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See also infra note 281 and accompanying
text. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (stating that under a broad view of life,
liberty, and property, the Fourteenth Amendment would become "a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States"). Thus, the fear
that automobile accidents will become a constitutional issue is a recurring concern of the Court. See
Wells & Eaton, supra note 127.
192. See Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs., 945 F.2d 716, 722 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (asserting that a party who is "involved in nothing more
than an automobile accident with a state official" has no constitutional cause of action); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (declaring that "survivors of an innocent bystander... negligently
killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle" have no constitutional claim).
193. 785 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1986).
194. Checki, 785 F.2d at 538 (noting that "where a police officer uses a police vehicle to
terrorize a civilian, and he has done so with malicious abuse of official power shocking to the
conscience, a court may conclude that the officers have crossed the 'constitutional line'").
195. Id. at 536.
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the court reasoned that a police officer's conduct rises to the level of a
constitutional violation when the officer terrorizes a civilian in a malicious
manner. 1%
B. The Recklessness Standard
Other lower federal courts have held that either recklessness or gross
negligence is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause."9
In Medina v. City and County of Denver,1 for example, the court ruled that
where the police act recklessly in a high speed chase and injure or kill the
suspect or a third party bystander, a cause of action exists for deprivation of the
innocent bystander's liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause.'"
The court ruled that reckless intent does not require that the actor intended to
harm a particular individual. ° Rather, it is sufficient that the actor was
aware of a known or obvious risk that was so great that it was highly probable
196. Id. at 538 (noting that a "['actual development... could lead to a jury question whether
[the] car-chasing actions were 'inspired by malice . . . so that it amounted to an abuse of official
power that shocks the conscience'").
197. Most circuit courts take the position that recklessness or deliberate indifference may give
rise to a due process claim. See, e.g., Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1988);
Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 17-18 (lst Cir. 1989); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898
F.2d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1990); Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1986); Davidson
v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); White v. Rochford, 592
F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218, 1226 (7th Cir.
1988); Medeiros v. Town of South Kingstown, 821 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D.R.I. 1993); Britt v. Little
Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 192 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp.
1320, 1324-25 (N.D. Ind. 1991). Additionally, other circuits have taken the position that even
gross negligence may serve as the basis of a due process violation. See, e.g., Jones v. Sherrill, 827
F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987); Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 803 (9th Cir.
1988); Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1988); Metzger v. Osbeck,
841 F.2d 518, 520 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Ct., 820 F.2d 194, 199-
200 (6th Cir. 1987); Colbum v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1988);
Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987). However, two circuit
courts of appeal have held that "gross negligence" is not sufficient, but they have not indicated
whether recklessness would suffice. See, e.g., Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297
(8th Cir. 1989); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986).
198. 960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992). In Medina, an innocent bystander, who was riding a
bicycle, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and County of Denver, and
several Denver police officers for injuries that occurred when the bystander was hit by a suspected
felon during a high speed automobile chase. Id. at 1494.
199. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1495-96. See aLso Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't,
905 F.2d 1445, 1446-47 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that "reckless conduct in police pursuit cases
must involve true indifference to the risks created").
200. Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the plaintiff does not need to show that the governmental actor intended him harm, only that reckless
conduct "must be directed toward the plaintiff").
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that serious harm would follow. 1
The court concluded that reckless conduct could be considered directed
toward a plaintiff if: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a definable group; (2) the
government's conduct places members of that group in substantial risk of serious
harm; (3) the risk was prominent; and (4) the governmental actor acted in
reckless disregard of that risk.' °  Additionally, the Medina court stated in
dicta that police liability in such cases will be "relatively rare."' However,
an officer may be found liable if the suspect's conduct can be "directly and
immediately" linked to the officer's conduct, and if the officer's pursuit of the
suspect was unreasonable under the circumstances.'
C. The Gross Negligence Standard
In Jones v. Sherrill, where police officers' pursuit of a fleeing suspect
ended in the death of an innocent bystander, the court applied what it called a
gross negligence test."3  The court found that the facts were insufficient to
charge police officers with outrageous or arbitrary conduct because the officers'
intent in initiating the chase was to insure public safety.' While gross
negligence is not easy to define,' the court reasoned that a person may be
201. Id. (noting that an act is reckless "when the actor does not care whether the other person
lives or dies, despite knowing that there is a significant risk of death" or grievous bodily harm).
See also Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1433 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that "intent is not
always required to establish a due process violation; our precedents have accepted recklessness as
a proxy for actual intent").
202. Medina, 960 F.2d at 1496 (citing Nishiyama v. Dickson County Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 282
(6th Cir. 1987). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 stating that "reckless
indifference" exists when a person acts:
[Iln reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to
do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of
facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Id.
203. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1499.
204. Id.
205. 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987). In Jones, police officers observed the defendant's
automobile being driven in an unsafe manner. Id. at 1103. When the police tried to stop the
vehicle, Sherrill fled, initiating a pursuit involving speeds up to 135 miles per hour in city traffic.
Id. at 1104. The chase ended when Sherrill's car crossed the center line and collided with Jones'
car, causing Jones' death. Id.
206. Id. at 1106 (asserting that "[n]egligence does not become 'gross' just by saying so
.... [W]e must ensure that gross negligence is something more than simple negligence .... ").
207. Id. (holding that the government conduct in pursuing Sherrill did not rise to the level of
gross negligence and "outrageous conduct.., which can state a ... claim. .. ").
208. See Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 1987)
(acknowledging that the phrase "'gross negligence' evades easy definition").
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liable if "he intentionally does something unreasonable with disregard to a
known risk or a risk so obvious that he must be assumed to have been aware of
it, and of a magnitude such that it is highly probable that harm will follow. "M
This same standard is reflected in the Eleventh Circuit's due process analysis in
Cannon v. Taylor.2"' In Cannon, the court held that an individual injured in
an automobile accident which was caused by the negligent or grossly negligent
conduct of a police officer did not violate a federal constitutional right. 2tt
Unfortunately, adding to the lower courts' difficulty in ascertaining the
appropriate culpability level needed to invoke the protections of the Due Process
Clause, is the courts' struggle to distinguish between gross negligence and
recklessness.2 11 Clearly, the malleable quality of these terms has spawned
criticism among many who see gross negligence as enhanced negligence.2"3
The rationale that emerges is that the line between these two terms ought not to
be drawn if it cannot be patrolled.214 Additionally, the distinction between
negligence and gross negligence does not adequately respond to the functions of
the Due Process Clause.215 Therefore, because of the subtle distinction
between negligence and gross negligence, courts have had trouble discerning the
difference between recklessness and negligence." 6
Once a substantive due process theory is recognized within the context of
police pursuit cases, detailed proof is essential to avoid the higher standards for
summary judgment and directed verdict typically applied in constitutional law
cases. However, substantive due process standards have been poorly defined,
209. Jones, 827 F.2d at 1106 (citing Nishiyama, 814 F.2d at 282).
210. 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir. 1986). In Cannon, the plaintiff was killed when a police vehicle,
responding to a disturbance call, collided with her car. Id. at 948. As a result, the plaintiff's
personal representative brought a damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officer alleging
that the officer deprived the plaintiff of life without due process of law. Id.
211. Cannon, 782 F.2d at 950.
212. See Mshiyama, 814 F.2d at 282. (expressing that a person acts negligently if he
"intentionally does something unreasonable with disregard to a known risk .. .).
213. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Brett, 152
Eng. Rep. 737, 739. (1843).
214. See Stanulonis v. Marzec, 649 F. Supp. 1536, 1543 (D. Conn. 1986) (noting that the
distinction between negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness is the difference between "'a fool,
a damned fool, and a God-damned fool'").
215. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 334 n.3 (1986) (observing that the Due
Process Clause is designed to control the abuses of governmental power, and on that account does
not reach negligence, but does proscribe intentional conduct).
216. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342, 350 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that an officer was
negligent for having his pistol cocked while trying to handcuff a suspect, stating that this action
indicated a "reckless disregard for the rights of the suspect. . . ."), vacated, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.
1985) (en banc). But see Britt v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 721 F. Supp. 189, 193 (E.D. Ark. 1989)
(stating that "'[rlecklessness is a proxy for intent, 'gross negligence' is not"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. g (1965) (contrasting negligence and recklessness).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 1 [1995], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss1/4
1995] IN THE HEAT OF THE CHASE 205
which is perhaps the leading criticism of the doctrine. 2 7  Indeed, the
development of a more concrete standard has been retarded in the Supreme
Court by the Court's continued refusal to confront the issue directly.2l5
Although lower federal courts have not avoided the problem, their efforts to deal
with the issue are hindered by the Supreme Court's lack of guidance. The lower
courts' standards in constitutional tort cases are as vague as the shocks the
conscience standard. As noted above, many of the courts that recognize or
apply substantive due process principles do so with little or no genuine analysis,
especially in police pursuit cases where an innocent bystander is injured.
Therefore, the need for a more concrete and uniform standard is essential to
alleviate the confusion in the lower federal courts regarding the appropriate
standard to apply to determine substantive due process violations involving
police pursuit situations.
V. PROPOSAL TO RECTIFY THE QUAGMIRE OF FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING POLICE PURSUr CASES
In the framework of police pursuit situations, police misconduct can best
be kept within constitutional norms by maintaining one clear, objective standard
of liability. A balance between an individual's federally protected rights and the
public's interest in effective law enforcement would be most successfully
reached by establishing a standard based on the extensive body of existing
Fourteenth Amendment case law. 2 '9  The need for a concrete Fourteenth
Amendment standard is shown by the confusion within the lower federal courts
and the less than enthusiastic regard many jurists have for substantive due
process analysis.' m  Additionally, consistency in the application of one
217. See, e.g., Faganv. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994) (conceding the
fact that there is "scarce authority in case law and little academic writing that attempts to reconcile
the 'shocks the conscience' test with the reckless disregard/gross negligence inquiry").
218. The reluctance of the Supreme Court to confront the issue of what level of culpability is
needed to rise to the level of a constitutional violation is seen by the Court's liberal use of
terminology in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (failing to characterize
the city's failure to warn its employees of danger as "arbitrary, or conscience-shocking").
219. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text (discussing the deliberate indifference
standard used by the Supreme Court to gauge municipal liability for failing to adequately train its
agents).
220. See, e.g., Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986), overruled by Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d
706 (7th Cir. 1987). In Gumz, Judge Easterbrook attacked the rise of substantive due process,
asserting that:
Because substantive due process has always been so dependent on the personal feelings
of the Justices; because it has no pedigree other than a trail of defunct, little-mourned,
and sometimes (as in Dred Scott) pernicious doctrines; and because there is no need to
conjure up a constitutional doctrine when there is an [a]mendment directed to this
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standard is furthered by favoring an objective state of mind inquiry over a
subjective inquiry. Police misconduct can be evaluated more efficiently by
removing the uncertainty that ensues from inquiring into a police officer's
subjective motivations. Such a uniform standard would also occasion the least
disruption and contribute most to doctrinal uniformity.
As stated before, in Daniels v. Williams and Davidson v. Cannon, the
Supreme Court held that negligent conduct cannot constitute a deprivation of due
process." The Court reasoned that the word "deprive" connotes more than
negligence and also noted that due process is not implicated when there has been
no affirmative abuse of power.' Yet, the Court indicated that it would
consider intentional conduct resulting in a loss to be a deprivation and hinted
that something less, such as gross negligence,' or recklessness might
suffice.'2 Additionally, the Court in Davidson underscored the breadth of its
holding, observing that negligent conduct, whether procedural or substantive,
does not trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. ' It is clear that
intentional misconduct by a governmental official can constitute a violation of
a right protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, but
mere negligence does not.2 The question remains whether the protections of
due process are triggered by grossly negligent or reckless conduct. Thus, the
highest culpability level that an innocent bystander must prove in order to invoke
specific subject, we should not employ substantive due process here. Substantive due
process is a shorthand for judicial privilege to condemn things that the judges do not like
or cannot understand.
Id. at 1406.
221. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (emphasis added); Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).
222. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548-49 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
223. The Eighth Circuit, however, has interpreted Daniels as holding that gross negligence is
not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the Supreme Court left this question
open. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1468-69 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828
(1987). See also Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that gross
negligence is not sufficient to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause); Cannon v. Taylor,
782 F.2d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986).
224. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3 ("[A]ccordingly, this case affords us no occasion to
consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,'
is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause."). See also Davidson, 474 U.S. at
349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do believe, however, that official conduct which causes personal
injury due to recklessness or deliberate indifference, does not deprive the victim of liberty within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
225. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.
226. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3 (1986); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 586
(6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (concluding that substantive due process requires intentional conduct). Cf
Parran, 451 U.S. at 534 (expressing that "[niothing in the language of section 1983 or its legislative
history limits the statute soley to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights.").
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the principles of substantive due process is that the officer acted with some form
of intent. 7  In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Daniels and
Davidson, and the lower federal courts' confusion regarding this issue, this Note
proposes the standard of "deliberate indifference" as the minimum standard to
determine whether a police officer has violated an innocent bystander's
substantive due process rights. In order to better understand the rationale for
choosing the deliberate indifference standard, the impractibility of the other tests
must first be examined.
A. Rejecting Shocks the Conscience and Gross Negligence as Standards for
Analyzing Substantive Due Process Violations in Police Pursuit Cases
Although many lower federal courts have adopted the shocks the
conscience standard in determining substantive due process violations in police
pursuit situations, the standard has several drawbacks. First, the shocks the
conscience standard articulated in Rochin v. Californiam is too subjective and
vague to provide any real guidance for lower federal courts. 9  Unlike an
objective standard, the shocks the conscience test looks to the subjective state of
mind of the relevant government official.' In fact, even courts that have
applied the shocks the conscience standard are aware of the "amorphous and
imprecise inquiry" that the test requires." For instance, Judge Friendly of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals attempted in Johnson v. Glick 2 to clarify
227. After all, without the requisite mental state possessed by police officers in pursuit
situations, there would not exist a means to make a constitutional issue out of an ordinary state-law
tort cause of action.
228. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text (discussing
Rochin).
229. See Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons ofPaul
v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 197 & n.46 (1977); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 616
(D. Mass. 1982).
230. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989).
231. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994). See also
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the Rochin holding "is to make the
rule turn not on the Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here."); Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (criticizing Rochin for failing to analyze the case in terms of
search and seizure and thus, declining to follow it).
232. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). In Glick, the plaintiff
sought to use his claim of substantive due process as a means to assert a § 1983 personal security
claim. The plaintiff alleged that prior to and during his felony trial he had been held in state
facilities where he was injured when an official, without provocation, struck him with his fist. Id.
at 1029. Although Glick involved an unlawful force claim, as opposed to an action brought by an
injured bystander in a police pursuit case alleging a deprivation of a bystander's liberty interest, the
decision is demonstrative of the lower courts' difficulty in ascertaining and understanding the Rochin
Court's "shocks the conscience" test.
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the scope of Rochin's shocks the conscience standard. 3  Still, lower courts
have failed to apply the Glick factors in a uniform manner; thus, indicating the
difficulty of the Court's shocks the conscience test.?'
Second, the Supreme Court has precluded the application of the shocks the
conscience standard in factual circumstances similar to those where it arose:
criminal cases where the issue is the exclusion of evidence.? Consequently,
Rochin no longer has any relevance in factual situations analogous to those in
Rochin itself. Instead, it remains as a source from which courts quote the catch
phrase "shocks the conscience."
Third, because the Rochin Court did not examine the minimum culpability
level needed for the application of its holding, the shocks the conscience test
appears only to be a sufficient and not a necessary test.' The Supreme Court
has held that intentional conduct that causes a deprivation of a federally
233. Id. at 1032-33 (noting that the "shocks the conscience" test in Rochin set a standard that
needed greater definition). Judge Friendly set forth the following factors to aid in defining the type
of force needed to give rise to a constitutional tort based on substantive due process:
the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount
of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.
Id. at 1033.
234. Even though all courts have looked to the Glick factors for direction in examining unlawful
force claims, the courts have not been consistent in examining substantive due process claims. See,
e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500-01 (1lth Cir. 1985); Davis v. Forrest, 768
F.2d 257, 258 (8th Cir. 1985); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 1986). Today,
however, it appears as though unlawful force cases should be analyzed under the reasonableness test
of the Fourth Amendment, not under a substantive due process approach. See Graham, 490 U.S.
at 393-94. Still, this line of cases exemplifies the lower courts' struggle to understand Rochin's
"shocks the conscience" test.
235. The "shocks the conscience" standard was repudiated in cases that are akin to the facts
in Rochin. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 666 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (noting that
"seven Justices rejected the 'shock-the-conscience' constitutional standard . . .. "); Graham, 490
U.S. at 393-94 (rejecting the application of the "shocks the conscience" standard to Fourth
Amendment claims). The Graham Court specifically held that all Fourth Amendment claims should
be analyzed under "its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process'
approach." Id. at 395. See also Albrightv. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 810-14 (1994) (following the
holding in Graham). See also Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1311 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[tihe
Supreme Court has never established a 'shocks the conscience' test in a § 1983 action" because
Rochin was decided before the Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
236. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-74 (1952). The Rochin Court only stated
that conduct which "shocks the conscience" renders evidence inadmissible. Id. Thus, the Court
never held that only conduct that "shocks the conscience" suffices or is demanded to exclude certain
evidence. Id.
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protected right constitutes a due process violation.2" As a result, while it is
obvious that conduct that shocks the conscience satisfies the intentional conduct
standard delineated in Daniels, to make the shocks the conscience standard a
necessary standard would presumably require more than intentional conduct. All
of these factors, when combined, militate against the adoption of the shocks the
conscience standard. Indeed, the difficulty remains for lower federal courts to
determine what constitutes actionable conduct under Rochin's shocks the
conscience test, which has unquestionably caused these courts to employ several
different standards in substantive due process claims.
In addition to the shocks the conscience standard, gross negligence is also
inappropriate as a standard to determine substantive due process violations
within the context of police pursuits. The gross negligence standard adopted by
some lower federal courts is unsuitable because it, like the shocks the conscience
standard evades lucid definition.' Moreover, negligence does not become
"gross" just by stating so. Courts have asserted that if they are to make any
sense of the distinction between negligence and gross negligence, they must
guarantee that gross negligence rise to the level of something more than mere
negligence. 9 Despite many attempts, most commentators have come to the
conclusion that there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes gross
negligence.' Additionally, such a standard does not conform to the functions
of the Due Process Clause. That is, since gross negligence is not a proxy for
intent, grossly negligent conduct by a police officer is not enough to trigger the
protections of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause."4
To resolve the question left open by the lower federal courts concerning the
culpability level necessary to show a substantive due process violation in police
pursuit situations, we must look to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause for direction. This Note concludes that the fundamental
formulation in determining a violation under the Due Process Clause is whether
a police officer's conduct during a chase constitutes an arbitrary exercise of
governmental power. This Note proposes that an officer's deliberate
indifference toward the safety of innocent bystanders in conducting a high speed
car chase constitutes an arbitrary exercise of governmental power and therefore,
237. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
238. See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988) (maintaining that the
line between negligence and gross negligence cannot be 'policed' and thus is not "worth drawing
in constitutional law").
239. See Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987).
240. See W. PAGE KELON Sl" AL., supra note 18, § 34, at 212 (noting that gross negligence
signifies "more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious
indifference to the consequences").
241. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (noting that intentional conduct
is enough to rise to the level of a due process violation).
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a substantive due process violation.
B. Duty Not to Ad in an Arbitrary Manner
Historically, the protections of due process have been "applied to deliberate
decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property." 2 In cases involving non-fundamental liberty or property interests,
such as a bystander injured in a police pursuit situation, the Supreme Court has
suggested that governmental officials must not engage in arbitrary conduct.3'
Thus, the touchstone of the Due Process Clause is to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of governmental power,' and many courts have
emphasized this principle on a consistent basis.' This suggests that arbitrary
not only encompasses factors of fairness,' but also abuses of power.'
Furthermore, substantive due process is not an insurance plan aimed at
reimbursing people injured by the arbitrary acts of government officials.2'
Rather, it emerges to preclude the particular hazards that involve the relationship
between the governors and the governed. 4 9
In essence, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause should be
recognized as charging government officials with a general duty to perform
242. See Daniels 474 U.S. at 331.
243. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (noting that
the proper inquiry is whether the defendant "acted arbitrarily . .. ").
244. See, e.g., Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (quotation marks omitted); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 527 (1884); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 235, 244 (1819). See also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (declaring that the "touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against [the] arbitrary action of government") (quoting Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889).
245. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992) (noting that "the Due
Process Clause ... bars certain arbitrary, wrongful governmental actions"); Regents of the Univ.
of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); Harrah v. Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440
U.S. 194, 199 (1978). See also supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
246. In the context of procedural due process, the fairness concern is that the government will
not deprive individuals of their substantive rights without first providing procedural safeguards for
preventing or correcting the error. Thus, the government acts "arbitrarily" within the procedural
due process framework when it permits an unacceptably high risk of erroneous governmental actions
concluding in deprivations that will go unchecked. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-47
(1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
247. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).
248. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1322 (3d Cir. 1994) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
249. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (involving a criminal custody case).
Here, the governor-governed relationship was apparent because the state is holding a particular
suspect in custody. However, this same relationship arises in other situations as well. For instance,
it is difficult to imagine a prisoner confined to a cell as being more defenseless against a fellow
inmate's attack than an innocent citizen is to protect himself against a police vehicle speeding down
upon him at 90 miles per hour. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1322 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
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rationally, or not in an arbitrary fashion.' Unquestionably, police officers
who are involved in chase situations have a duty to the general public not to act
in an arbitrary manner."z ' Consequently, if a police officer conducts a high-
speed pursuit with a deliberate indifference to an innocent bystander's safety and
thereby causes injury or death, the officer is engaging in oppressive and
arbitrary conduct. This type of conduct should be prohibited by the doctrine of
substantive due process. Yet, the issue remains regarding what level of
culpability courts should apply to determine whether the officer's conduct rises
to the level of a substantive due process violation.
As a preliminary matter, before deliberately indifferent conduct can
constitute a constitutional deprivation, the deprivation must meet two
requirements to determine whether the state action requirement has been
met. 2  First, the loss must be caused by a governmental official who holds
a position of authority over the injured party. 3  Second, the loss must occur
as a result of the governmental official exercising power over the injured
party.' Obviously, a police officer's duty to enforce the laws of the state
and to ensure that citizens follow these laws constitutes a position of authority.
A police officer exercises governmental power when pursuing a fleeing suspect.
Therefore, police officers, in pursuing suspects, meet the state action
requirement because they are engaged in an activity that is distinctively
governmental in nature.25'
Recognizing that police officers engaged in a high speed pursuit have a duty
not to act in an arbitrary manner, what type of conduct constitutes a violation
250. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1321 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
251. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
252. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a cause of action under § 1983 compels only
a showing that a governmental action taken under color of law has resulted in a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330; Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). The requirement
that the challenged conduct must constitute both color of law and state action arises from § 1983's
.color of law" limitation and from the state action language contained in the Fourteenth Amendment
itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. However, according to
the Supreme Court, for all practical purposes "color of law" and state action are the same where
Fourteenth Amendment violations are implicated. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
935-37 (1982); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1970).
253. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1322 (3d Cir. 1994) (Cowen, I.,
dissenting); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935-37.
254. Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1322 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
255. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing § 1983's "color of state law"
requirement). But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978) (limiting state
action by private parties to certain public functions that have traditionally been reserved to the
government).
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of this duty? Certainly, the lower federal courts have labored to ascertain
precisely what type of police conduct against an innocent bystander will rise to
the level of a substantive due process violation. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that the Due Process Clause applies only to deliberate
deprivations of life, liberty, and property.' As a result, this Note advocates
deliberate indifference as the standard to evaluate whether a police pursuit
resulting in deaths or injuries to innocent bystanders violates substantive due
process.
C. The Standard of Deliberate Indifference
The value of choosing the standard of deliberate indifference is that the
Supreme Court has developed a body of case law interpreting these words,
unlike the shocks the conscience or gross negligence standards. In fact,
selecting a deliberate indifference standard is further supported by the fact that
it is the standard the Supreme Court utilizes to gauge the liability of
municipalities. 7  Within the framework of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
municipality can be liable for a failure to train its employees when the
municipality's failure to train shows a "deliberate indifference to the rights of
its inhabitants."= To meet the deliberate indifference standard, the failure
256. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (asserting that the guarantee of due
process has historically been applied to "deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a
person of life, liberty or property"); Davidsonv. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,347 (1986); City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
257. See City of Canton 489 U.S. 378, .388 (1989) (adopting the standard of "deliberate
indifference" as the culpability level necessary to establish § 1983 liability of a municipality based
upon a claim that the municipality's failure to train police officers caused a violation of a
constitutional right of a person subject to police action). See also supra notes 67-77 and
accompanying text (discussing the City of Canton decision). The deliberate indifference standard
has also been used to determine the liability of individual supervisors. See Doe v. Taylor Indep.
School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452-54 (5th Cir. 1994) (involving the sexual molestation of a student by
a public school teacher).
258. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (noting that "only where a failure to train reflects a
'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice by a municipality... can a city be liable for such a failure under
§ 1983"). In addition to claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard of deliberate
indifference has been held by the Supreme Court to be sufficient to state a claim for violations of
the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
However, in Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the
"deliberate indifference" standard, within the framework of the Eighth Amendment, is a subjective
test. Id. at 1984 (holding that a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment
"only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it"). Undoubtedly, the Eighth Amendment's subjective
"deliberate indifference" test cannot be applied to a Fourteenth Amendment claim brought by an
innocent bystander because it would be untenable to hold an innocent person, who was injured by
a police officer, to the same standard as a convicted criminal alleging injuries caused by prison
officials.
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to train must reflect a conscious or deliberate choice made by policymakers. 9
Moreover, for liability to attach, the identified deficiency in the city's training
program must be the "moving force" behind the violation of the constitutional
right.25 Specifically, the deliberate indifference standard was utilized by the
Supreme Court as a means to ensure that civil rights actions against
municipalities attain a certain level of significance before those entities are
required to defend themselves at trial."'
Frequently, the term deliberate indifference has been described as a
conscious or deliberate choice.' The term has also included actions labelled
as willful, wanton, and reckless in tort law.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has
noted that the meaning of the term deliberate indifference entails more than
negligence and something less than acts or omissions for the sole purpose of
causing harm. 4  Generally, courts have recognized that deliberate
indifference is ordinarily linked with recklessness.' An act is reckless when
it reflects a wanton or obdurate disregard or complete indifference to a risk, for
259. See C1iy of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
260. Id. at 388-89.
261. Id. at 391-92.
262. See Id. at 396 (upholding the obvious[ness] test and noting that liability is appropriate
when policymakers are "on actual or constructive notice" of the need to train) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Abbott v. City of Crocker, Mo., 30 F.3d 994,
999 (8th Cir. 1994); Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367-68 (9th
Cit. 1994); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994).
263. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 18 § 34, at 213. Moreover, the "willful,"
awanton," or "reckless" standard applies when an "actor has intentionally done an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly
probable that harm would follow." Id. See also Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1164 (st
Cir. 1989) (upholding a jury instruction that deliberate indifference can be shown by "a deliberate
choice to follow a course of action or non-action which, in effect translates as 'we don't give a damn
• . ."); Willis v. Bell, 726 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 n.14 (N.D. Il. 1989) (maintaining that deliberate
indifference regularly has been treated as permissibly creating an inference of intent).
264. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (1994) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319 (1986). The Restatement effectively differentiates intent, recklessness, and negligence as
follows: All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended. However, intent is
not limited to consequences which are desired. N the actor knows that the consequences are certain,
or substantially certain, to result from this act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he
had in fact desired to produce that result. As the probability that certain consequences will follow
decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor's conduct loses the character of
intent, and becomes mere recklessness. Further, as the probability decreases, and amounts only to
a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).
265. See, e.g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993); Manarite v. City
of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953,957 (1st Cir. 1992); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,
1443 (9th Cir. 1991); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990); Martin v. White,
742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984). See also City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 269
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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instance "when the actor does not care whether the other person lives or dies,
despite knowing that there is a significant risk of death" or grievous bodily
injury.' Accordingly, it is fair to say that acting with deliberate indifference
to a substantial risk of serious harm to an innocent bystander is the equivalent
to acting with reckless disregard or with reckless indifference to that risk.'
Although it may be difficult to discern what type of conduct all of these terms
entail, several branches of the law overflow with "nice distinctions that may be
troublesome but have been thought nonetheless necessary . . .'
Therefore, this Note proposes that the standard of liability under § 1983 for
a substantive due process violation in a police pursuit case is whether the
pursuing officer acted with a deliberate indifference to public safety. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a police officer acts with deliberate indifference if he
was aware of a known or obvious risk that was so great that it was highly
probable that serious harm would follow, and he proceeded in conscious and
unreasonable disregard of the consequences. m To establish deliberate
266. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445, 1446-47 n.3
(10th Cir. 1990) (stating that conduct in police pursuit cases must involve true indifference to risks
created).
267. The deliberate indifference standard of fault adopted by this note is analogous to reckless
disregard of safety, which is well defined in tort law:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or
intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such a
risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
268. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1986) (citing OuVER W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 3 (1923) that "the difference between one end of the spectnim-negligence-andthe
other-intent-is abundantly clear.").
269. See Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992);
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally,
it should be noted that the "deliberate indifference" standard proposed by this Note is an objective
standard. See Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56, 70 (Or. 1960) (noting that the typical
.expressions such as 'reckless disregard,' 'reckless state of mind,' 'conscious indifference,'
'conscious choice of action,' are not to be taken to mean that there must be proof that defendant
actually had such a state of mind; such expressions are appropriate to describe the hypothetical state
of mind of the hypothetical reasonable man who, faced with the dangerous situation, nevertheless
elected to encounter it.").
In the lower federal courts, the reckless indifference standard has also been applied to custody
cases. See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991); Williams
v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989); Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d
414, 416 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that "wanton or obdurate disregard of or deliberate indifference
to the prisoner's right to life as a condition of confinement is a substantive constitutional deprivation
whether it falls under the due process clause or the Eighth Amendment."); Morales v. New York
State Dep't of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988) (asserting that "a state prison guard's
deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and dependent
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indifference, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendants either had
actual knowledge of a substantial risk or had knowledge of facts that would
indicate this risk to any reasonable person.' Obviously, the risk and
disastrous consequences are heightened in a police pursuit situation where the
life and safety of the public within the vicinity of the chase are endangered by
the deliberate indifference of police conduct.
The concerns that have been voiced against the use of the deliberate
indifference standard can be easily answered. First, the deliberate indifference
standard advanced by this Note is not being used for the same purpose as it is
used to impose liability on a municipality."' In fact, the Supreme Court has
determined that the deliberate indifference standard adopted for failure to train
claims is not affected by the culpability level that a plaintiff must demonstrate
in order to prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right. 2
Therefore, it is logical to assume that while deliberate indifference functions to
ensure that the individual police officer does not act in an arbitrary and
capricious manner toward an innocent bystander, the term was applied in the
City of Canton case for an altogether different purpose. In City of Canton,
deliberate indifference is the threshold for holding a city liable for the
constitutional torts committed by its inadequately trained police officers.'m
Needless to say, considerable conceptual difficulty would accompany any search
for the objective state of mind of a governmental entity, as distinguished from
that of an individual police officer.' On a more elementary level, the
standard adopted by the Court in City of Canton applies to the deliberate
indifference of a city toward the training of its agents. On the other hand, the
standard applied to an individual officer reflects the other's deliberate
indifference toward the safety of an innocent bystander.
upon him may support a claim under § 1983."); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (noting that a defendant may be held liable under § 1983 if it is shown that the defendant
"exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty . . ").
270. See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976).
271. The deliberate indifference standard has been embraced by the Supreme Court in City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) to determine municipal liability for failing to adequately train
its agents. Id. at 388. See also supra notes 257-70 and accompanying text.
272. See Miy of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 n.8 (recognizing that the municipal fault requirement
"does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying
... constitutional violation.').
273. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992).
274. See, e.g., City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (stating that "[oinly where a failure to train
reflects a 'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice by a municipaliry . . .can a city be liable ... )
(emphasis added).
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Second, a finding of individual liability on behalf of the police officer will
not impose vicarious liability on a city.' The Supreme Court has determined
that a city can be held liable for a policy of failing to train police officers only
if that specific policy causes a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional
rights. 6 Clearly, a city cannot be held liable in connection with a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, on a failure to train theory, unless one of the pursuing
officers is found liable on the underlying substantive claim.' Moreover,
even if the individual police officer is found liable, the plaintiff still must show
that: (1) the city's failure to train amounted to a deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come in contact;' and (2) that the
city's policy was the "moving force"' behind the constitutional injury.'
275. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (declaring that a
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor and therefore, no respondeat
superior liability can exist under § 1983).
276. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89.
277. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) (holding that
damages could not be awarded against a municipality "when in fact the jury has concluded that the
officer inflicted no constitutional harm.").
278. See Vukadinovich v. Zentz, 995 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing that since
plaintiff has not shown that the city was "deliberately indifferent" to constitutional rights of its
citizens or that it haphazardly dismissed meritorious citizen complaints, the city cannot be held liable
where a jury returns a verdict in favor of its police officers, even though mechanisms were in place
to investigate citizen complaints); Abbott v. City of Crocker, Mo., 30 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that since the city operated under the mistaken belief regarding its authority outside city
limits, there was no showing that the city acted with "deliberate indifference" or made a conscious
choice to violate plaintiff's civil rights); Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d
1355, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that as a means to establish that the city's failure to train
demonstrates deliberate indifference, an aggrieved plaintiff must allege a program wide inadequacy;
failure to train a single officer or to demonstrate that inadequacy was the result of a deliberate or
conscious choice); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that where a
city provides police officers with potentially dangerous animals and evidence is established that those
animals inflict harm in numerous cases where they are utilized, failure to employ a departmental
policy regulating their use constitutes a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights for which
municipal liability may be assessed).
279. See Tilson v. Forrest City Police Dep't., 28 F.3d 802, 808 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
a showing of evidence that the police department knew an arrestee had been incarcerated and neither
the police chief nor the department had declared any written procedures to guide criminal
investigations did not establish liability on behalf of the city because the plaintiff failed to prove that
a departmental custom or policy was the "moving force" behind the incarceration); Searcy v. City
of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 287 (6th'Cir. 1994) (finding that although the city failed to investigate, the
city was not liable because there was no evidence demonstrating a failure to investigate was the
"moving force" behind the shooting of the plaintiffs); Jones v. City of Carlisle, Ky., 3 F.3d 945,
950 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that a city policy of not training police officers to report to the driver's
license authority motorists involved in accidents that were caused by epileptic seizures was not the
"moving force" behind the plaintiff's injuries); Fernandez v. Leonard, 963 F.2d 459, 468 (1st Cir.
1992) (stating that because the plaintiff failed to prove that the city's failure to provide hostage
training to its police force was the moving force behind the constitutional violation, there was no
liability on the part of the city).
280. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1989).
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Thus, cities are insulated from liability unless these two requirements are met,
regardless of the fact that an officer is found liable on the underlying substantive
claim.
Third, although the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have stated that
claims involving automobile accidents do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation merely because one of the drivers is a government official," this
argument is not valid, especially within the context of police pursuits. It is
obvious that the Supreme Court, in dicta, was merely reiterating, by way of
example, that ordinary state torts committed by government officials do not
violate the Constitution. However, high-speed pursuits conducted with
deliberate indifference which result in injury are not comparable to the average
automobile accident. Instead, these high-speed pursuits entail an abuse of police
powers that are uniquely bestowed upon a police officer and which entail grave
risks when exercised. Indeed, a high-speed pursuit is definitely not equivalent
to the act of an ordinary citizen travelling to work in a leisurely manner.
Moreover, the innocent bystander who happens to be walking or driving near
the route of the high-speed chase is often defenseless. Accordingly, it is likely
that a high-speed chase conducted with deliberate indifference does rise to the
level of a constitutional deprivation. Therefore, recognizing such a cause of
action based on a police officer's deliberate indifference will not "make of the
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law. "m
Finally, the adoption of a clearly objective test such as deliberate
indifference will not only provide doctrinal uniformity, but will also ensure that
insubstantial claims do not proceed to trial. Unlike an objective standard, a
subjective standard requires a factual determination that seldom can be resolved
on summary judgment.' Additionally, a subjective standard necessitates an
immense amount of discovery and the deposing of numerous government
officials.' Obviously, these inquiries can interfere with effective
government.' An objective standard will tend to shield government officials
from the dangers of trial distractions, allow them to perform their discretionary
functions, and encourage able people to enter public service.' Ultimately,
281. See, e.g., Parrati v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (noting that a "party who is
involved in nothing more than an automobile accident with a state official" has no constitutional
claim); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (stating that "survivors of an innocent bystander
. . . negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle" have no constitutional claim);
Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs., 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991). However, it must be
noted that this language is dicta, and the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed this issue.
282. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
283. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982).
284. See Id. at 817.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 816.
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an objective standard will provide government officials, such as police officers,
with the ability to reasonably anticipate when their conduct may subject them to
liability for damages.' Therefore, an objective deliberate indifference
standard grants protection to all police officers, except those who knowingly
violate the law.'
In order to illustrate the effectiveness and validity of the deliberate
indifference standard, this Note will reconsider the facts of Fagan v. City of
Vineland.' The injured bystanders in the Fagan scenario will seek
compensation for their injuries. The injured bystanders will most likely seek
redress under § 1983 because such a claim will allow the bystanders to bring the
suit into federal court and to recover attorney fees.' Therefore, the issue is
whether the police officers in Fagan violated the bystanders' substantive due
process rights.
D. Application of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
In Fagan, a chase ensued when a Vineland police officer observed a
Camaro with a passenger standing up through the open T-top roof"' During
the chase through residential neighborhoods, the pursuing police vehicles ran
several red lights and reached speeds of up to sixty miles per hour. 2 The
chase ended when, in an attempt to evade the Vineland police officers, the
Camaro crashed into the innocent bystanders' vehicle, killing both
passengers.2 9  As a result, the estates of the innocent bystanders brought an
action under § 1983, alleging that the police officers violated the bystanders'
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. Additionally, the
Attorney General's pursuit guidelines stated that high-speed chases are seldom
appropriate for non-hazardous violations or for completed minor traffic
violations.'
287. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
288. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
289. 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994). See also supra notes 167-83 and accompanying text
(discussing the Fagan decision).
290. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) (1988) (furnishing federal jurisdiction); 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1988) (allowing a prevailing party to recover attorney fees). See also Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 782-83 (1989) (discussing "prevailing party"
status).
291. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1299.
292. Id. at 1300. The fleeing Camaro reached speeds up to 80 miles per hour. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1300 & n. 1 (3d Cir. 1994) (identifying the
City's guidelines governing high-speed motor vehicle pursuits).
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Analyzing the factual transaction of the case, a court must first determine
whether the bystanders meet the requirements of § 1983. To sustain a § 1983
action, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the conduct complained of was
committed by a police officer acting under color of state law; and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional or statutory rights.29 5  In
considering the first prong of the test, it is not disputed that in chasing the
suspect, the police officers were acting under color of state law.' As for the
second prong, a court must consider whether the police officers' conduct caused
a deprivation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Thus, the court's analysis
must start by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly violated by the
police officers. Since § 1983 does not contain a state of mind inquiry, the
plaintiff need only prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right.'
Here, the bystanders based their claim on the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Specifically, the bystanders
alleged that the police officers deprived them of life and liberty without due
process of law. The Supreme Court has held that due process is not implicated
by the negligent act of a police officer causing an unintended loss of life, liberty,
or property. 2' Thus, this Note proposes that a court should measure the
officers' conduct during such a police chase against the deliberate indifference
standard. Next, the court must ascertain whether the officer's conduct, in
chasing the suspect through residential neighborhoods at a high rate of speed,
showed a deliberate indifference to the innocent bystanders' safety.
To recover under the deliberate indifference standard proposed by this
Note, the bystanders must show that the police officers had actual knowledge of
a substantial risk, or had knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person
to observe that risk. 3' In other words, the bystanders must prove that the
police officers did not care whether the innocent bystanders lived or died, or that
the police officers were completely indifferent to the possibility that the
bystanders could be injured. °" Additionally, in determining whether the
decision of the Vineland police officers to initiate or continue the pursuit
constituted deliberate indifference, the court should weigh the risk of injury to
295. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 252-55 (discussing the state action requirement).
297. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986).
298. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (noting that substantive due process bars certain government
actions in order to prevent governmental power from being used for oppressive purposes).
299. Id. at 330-31.
300. See supra note 269 (noting that a police officer acts with "deliberate indifference" if he
is aware of a known or obvious risk which is so great that it is highly probable that serious harm
will follow, and he proceeds in conscious and unreasonable disregard of the consequences).
301. The term "deliberate indifference" has been characterized as a "conscious" or "deliberate
choice," and has included actions classified as willful, wanton, and reckless. See W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., supra note 18, at 213.
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the innocent bystander against the interest in apprehending suspects. 3 2
"Factors relevant to that determination include: the speed and area of pursuit,
weather and road conditions, the presence or absence of pedestrians and other
traffic, alternative methods of apprehension, applicable police regulations, and
the danger posed to the public by the suspect being pursued. " '
The application of the deliberate indifference standard to the facts in Fagan
tends to show a disregard for the innocent bystanders' safety. First, the
Vineland police officers failed to follow the pursuit guidelines when they
engaged in a high-speed pursuit of an offender of a minor traffic violation.' 4
Second, the guidelines instructed officers to exercise caution in residential
neighborhoods.' Furthermore, it may be inferred that the police officers'
actions in chasing the suspect caused the suspect to gain speed by doubling the
number of pursuing vehicles.' Although the police pursuit guidelines are not
dispositive, it is still possible for the police officers to conduct a pursuit with
deliberate indifference independent of whether they followed the pursuit
guidelines. Additionally, the chase occurred on a residential street, and the
chase involved high speeds in excess of eighty miles per hour with repeated
running of stop lights and stop signs. Further, the dangerousness of such
conduct to the people along the chase route was known or obvious, the injured
bystander was lawfully using the street, and the police directly caused the
suspect to run a red light and crash into the innocent bystander.'
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Vineland
police officers, by initiating and maintaining a reckless car chase without regard
for the life and safety of citizens, vividly establish a deliberately indifferent
exercise of governmental power. Here, due to the officers' actions of chasing
the suspect through narrow city streets at an excessive rate of speed, the
Vineland police officers had knowledge of facts that would indicate a substantial
risk to a reasonable person. Accordingly, instead of being defeated on a
summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs have at least presented enough facts to
proceed to trial.
302. See Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn. 1994).
303. Id.
304. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1300 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
305. Id. It should be noted that a violation of state law is not a per se violation of the federal
standard of deliberate indifference adopted by this note, although it is a relevant factor to assessing
deliberate indifference.
306. Id.
307. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (3d Cir. 1994).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Alarmed by the increase in high-speed pursuits that are killing hundreds of
people every year, police departments around the country, as well as state and
federal law makers, are clamping down on wild, Hollywood style pursuits that
regularly involve caravans of speeding police vehicles. However, without the
adoption of a uniform standard to be applied to police pursuit situations, not
only will injured innocent bystanders similarly situated receive different
treatment from the courts, but law enforcement officials will also have difficulty
in tailoring their conduct so as to carry out their duties to the optimal extent
without incurring liabilities. Allowing deliberate indifferent conduct to state a
claim in a police pursuit case under the Due Process Clause will serve the
purpose of preventing arbitrary exercise of government power. Unlike the
shocks the conscience or gross negligence standard, the value of choosing
deliberate indifference is that the Supreme Court has developed a body of case
law interpreting this phrase. Further, the adoption of such an explicit standard
provides police officers with the ability to reasonably foresee when their conduct
may subject them to liability. Such an objective standard will assist lower
federal courts with their substantive due process analysis, especially within the
framework of police pursuits. By adopting the deliberate indifference standard,
the polestar principle of public safety will prevail and the paramount duty to
protect the public will not be thrown to the winds in the heat of the chase.
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